North Dakota Law Review
Volume 59

Number 1

Article 2

1983

Due-on-Sale: Recent Developments Affecting the Future of Dueon-Sale Litigation
Lowell Philip Bottrell

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Bottrell, Lowell Philip (1983) "Due-on-Sale: Recent Developments Affecting the Future of Due-on-Sale
Litigation," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 59 : No. 1 , Article 2.
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol59/iss1/2

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu.

NOTE

DUE-ON-SALE: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING
THE FUTURE OF DUE-ON-SALE LITIGATION

I. INTRODUCTION
Preemption of state law by federal law originates in the
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. 1 The
preemption issue usually does not involve interpreting the

Constitution, but rather involves comparing two statutes. 2 In this
Note the conflict arises mainly between federal regulations3 and
1. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The supremacy clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id. In this context the word statute is used interchangeably with regulation and case law. See infra note

3.
2. The preemption issue arises when state statutory or case law conflicts with federal law. The
conflict may be a direct contradiction of federal law by state law or an indirect circumvention of
federal intention. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
3. Federal regulations have the same preemptive effect as federal statutes. Fidelity Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 102 S. Ct. 3014, 3022 (1982). The regulations involved in the due-onsale clause issue are 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(l) and 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(g). Section 545.8-3(f) provides
in part:
Due-on-sale clauses. An association continues to have the power to include, as a
matter of contract, between it and the borrower, a provision in its loan instrument
whereby the association may, at its option, declare immediately due and payable sums
secured by the association's security instrument if all or any part of the real property
securing the loan is sold or transferred by the borrower without the association's prior
written consent. Except as provided in paragraph (g)....
12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(f) (1982) (emphasis in original).
Section 545.8-3(g) provides in part:
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4
state case law.

States, wishing to retain control of areas traditionally subject
to their discretion, increasingly confront the federal preemption
issue. 5 This contact results in conflicting case law and makes it
difficult for the attorney to counsel his client on the status of
applicable law in that jurisdiction.
This state-federal conflict recently arose in the United States
Supreme Court in the area of mortgage law. 6 Federal law again
prevailed. An unsettled issue, however, is whether federal law,
under regulations promulgated by the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board (Bank Board) 7 affecting federally chartered 8 savings and loan
institutions and the recently enacted federal statute affecting state
lenders, preempts state mortgage law. 9
The purpose of this Note is to address the relationship of
preemption to due-on-sale clauses, particularly the status of dueon-sale law after Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Association v. de la
Cuesta.10 Principal issues involve the remedies available to the
mortgagor and mortgagee and the forum in which they seek those
remedies. Specifically, this Note examines the effect of state law on
due-on-sale clauses; whether federal law may be applied
retroactively to give a federal savings and loan institution authority
to enforce a due-on-sale clause that was invalid under state law at
Limitations on the exercise of due-on-sale clauses. With respect to any loan made after
July 31, 1976, on the security of a home occupied or to be occupied by the borrower, a
Federal association: (1) Shall not exercise a due-on-sale clause because of(i) creation
of a lien or other encumbrance subordinate to the association's security instrument;
(ii) creation of a purchase money security interest for household appliances; (iii) transfer by devise, descent, or operation of law on the death of a joint tenant; or (iv) granting a leasehold interest of three years or less not containing an option to purchase; (2)
shall not impose a prepayment charge or equivalent fee for acceleration of the loan by
exercise of a due-on-sale clause; and (3) waives its option to exercise a due-on-sale
clause as to a specific transfer if, before the transfer, the association and the person to
whom the property is to be sold or transferred ... agree in writing that the person's
credit is satisfactory to the association and that interest on sums secured by the
association's security interest will be payable at a rate the association shall request.
12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(g) (1982) (emphasis in original).
4. State law that conflicts with the federal regulations varies from state to state. Most conflicting
state law involves restraint on alienation. For a discussion of restraint on alienation, see infra notes
65-99 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 308 N.W.2d 471, 475
(Minn. 1981).
6. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 102 S. Ct. 3014 (1982).
7. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board was created under the Federal Home Loan Bank Act,
ch. 577, § 17, 47 Stat. 736 (1933), amended by 12 U.S.C. § 1437 (1976). The Bank Board, formed in
1932, is an independent federal regulatory agency with authority to administer the Home Owners'
Loan Act of 1933 (HOLA). 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
8. Federal charters are granted pursuant to 5 5(a) of HOLA. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980).
9. For a discussion of this recent legislation, see infra notes 167-88 and accompanying text.
10. 102 S. Ct. 3014 (1982). The due-on-sale clause preemption issue involves situations in which
federal preemption is asserted in response to the affirmative defense that state law precludes
enforcement of the due-on-sale clause.
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the time the mortgage was executed; whether federal courts have
federal jurisdiction to hear actions involving mortgage
accelerations; and whether a state court may refuse to enforce dueon-sale clauses by exercising its equitable jurisdiction.
II. STATE STATUS OF DUE-ON-SALE CLAUSES
A.

EVOLUTION OF DUE-ON-SALE CLAUSES

A discussion of the evolution of the due-on-sale clause 1 is
essential to understanding the legal problems associated with it.
The clause was designed to protect the lender's security from
impairment caused by a transfer, without the lender's consent,
from the original mortgagor to an unacceptable transferee. 12 The
due-on-sale clause, however, developed into a means by which the
3
lender can maximize its interest income. 1
1I. A due-on-sale clause is an acceleration clause contained in mortgages or deeds of trust that
requires the lender's consent prior to any transfir of the borrower's interest. See Holiday Acres No. 3
v. Midwest Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 3(18 N.W.2d 471, 480 (Minn. 1981). Under a due-on-sale
lause the lender may deny consent and declare the entire mortgage balance due and payable. Id.
The most common due-on-sale clause is often referred to as paragraph 17, which provides:
17. Transfer of the Property; Assumption. If all or any part of the Property or an
interest therein is sold or transferred by Borrower without Lender's prior written
consent, excluding (a) the creation of a lien cr encumbrance subordinate to this
Mortgage, (b) the creation of a purchase money security interest for household
appliances, (c) a transfier by devise, descent or by operation of law upon the death of a
joint tenant or (d) the grant of any leasehold interest of three years or less not
containing an option to purchase, Lender may, at Lender's option, declare all the
sums secured by this Mortgage to be immediately due and payable. Lender shall have
waived such option to accelerate if, prior to the sale or transfer, Lender and the person
to whtot the Property is to be sold or transferred reach agreement in writing that the
credit of such person is satisfactory to Lender and that the interest payable on the sums
secured by this Mortgage shall be at such rate as Lender shall request. If Lender has
waived the option to accelerate provided in this paragraph 17, and if Borrower's
successor in interest has executed a written assumption agreement accepted in writing
by l.ender, l.ender shall release Borrower from all obligations under this Mortgage
and the Note.
Weincr, Due-on-Sale: Enforceable, 61 Muc:m. B.J. 214, 226 n. 1 (1982). See also Fidelity Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. dc la Cuesta, 102 S. Ct. at 3018 n.2 (paragraph 17 used by the parties).
Other clauses provide:
In the event that the mortgagors convey the title (legal, equitable or both) to all or
any portion of said premises or in the event that such title becomes vested in a person
cther than the mortgagors in any manner whatsoever except under the power of
enminent domain, that in any such case the entire unpaid principal of the note secured
hereby with all accrued interest thereon shall, at the option of the mortgagee at any
time thereafter, become immediately due and payable without notice.
Holiday Acres Nc. 3 v. Midwest Fed. Say. & Lcan Ass'n, 308 N.W.2d at 474. See also First Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n v. Anderson, 681 F.2d 528, 530 n.1 (8th Cir. 1982) (transfer occurs if the mortgagor
sells or conveys all or any part of his interest).
12. See 55 AM. JUR. 2D Mortgages § 371 (1971). See generally Bonanno, Due on Sale and Prepayment
Clauses in Real Estate Financing in California in Times of Fluctuating Interest Rates - Legal Issues and
Alternatives, 6 U.S.F.L. REv. 267 (1972).
13. See Holiday Acres No. 3, 308 N.W.2d at 480-81. See generally Note, The Due-on-Sale Clause:
Enforcement Standards,60 NFB. L. Rvv. 594, 607-11 (1981).
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Most mortgages 1 4 subjected to litigation in the past few years
were executed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Interest rates on the
earlier mortgages are considerably lower than those available in the
present market.15 Furthermore, statistics indicate that a mortgage,
though written for a fixed number of years, usually turns over in
about twelve years. 16 This turnover is due to such factors as
geographic relocations and life style changes of the mortgagors.
Recently, the American economy has experienced an
economic inflationary spiral. 1 7 Because a lending institution's
existence is based upon the funds that it has available to lend out,
this economic spiral has forced lenders to accelerate mortgages to
keep their loan portfolios current.18 To insure solvency institutions
devised methods to accelerate their mortgages. 19 One mechanism is
the due-on-sale clause.
Use of the due-on-sale clause to exact higher interest rates has
been the proverbial "thorn in the side" for both the mortgagor and
mortgagee. When a mortgage is assumed the mortgagee prefers to
raise the interest rate to increase its rate of return. 20 The
mortgagor, on the other hand, wants the interest rate to remain the
same for two reasons. First, his property is more marketable at a
rate lower than the prevailing market rate. 21 Second, the purchaser
may insist on a lower purchase price if forced to pay the higher
22
prevailing market rate of interest.
When considering these competing positions, courts find
14. The term mortgage and deed of trust are used interchangeably in this Note. For a detailed
discussion of the two instruments, see Williams v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 910, 913
nn.3-4 (4th Cir. 1981). In Williams the court held that "while the lbrmalities diler, fin" many
essential intents and purposes.., a deed of trust is equivalent to a mortgage." Id. at 913.
Oklahoma has statutorily subjected deeds oftrust to mortgage law: "Every deed of trust on real
property, intended as security, shall be subject to all statutory provisions and laws relating to
mortgages." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 1.1 (West 1981 & Supp. 1982).
15. SeeBreaux, Due-on-SaleLitigation,30 LA. B.J. 18 (1982) (7.5% in.June of 1972 and 17.5% ill
July 1981).
423 N.E.2d 998, 1001
16. Dunham v. Ware Sav. Bank, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1607, -,
(1981). Figures indicate that mortgages originating in the 1910s remained outstanding on the
average from 6.5 to 9.8 years. Recently that figure has changed to 12 years because economic
conditions have made people less transient. Id. Mortgage turnover means that although the
mortgage is executed for a fixed term, 25 or 30 years thr example, the borrower usually pays offor
transfers the mortgage to another party in a shorter period of time. See Martin v. Peoples Mut. Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 319 N.W.2d 220, 226 (Iowa 1982).
17. See generally Berryhill, 7he Due-on-Sale Clause: A Marriage Gone Sour - A Checklist for the
Practitioner, 16 U. Rtcn. L. REv. 35, 38 (1981); Crocker, The "Due-on-Sale" Mortgage Clause ni a
Methodof Reconcilingthe Competing Interests ofLender and Borrower, 84 W. VA. L. REV. 301,307 (1982).
18. See generally Case Review, 39 WASH. & LFE L. REv. 524 (1982).
19. Berryhill, supra note 17, at 39.
433 A.2d 1312, 1315
20. See Mills v. Nashua Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 121 N.H. 722, -,
(1981). The mortgagee asserts that it is entitled to the increase in interest based on the average life
time of the loan. See Dunham v. Ware Say. Bank, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 16)7, 423 N.E.2d 998
(1981).
21. See Sonny Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Sav. Ass'n, 633 S.W.2d 811, 818 (Tex. 1982) (Spears,J.,
concurring).
22. Id.
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themselves aligned as either proconsumer or prolender. 23 Courts
must decide whether the clause is legally enforceable, and if so,
whether the factual situation before them allows equitable
enforcement.
In analyzing the problem many courts consider not only the
legal implications of their decisions, but to a significant degree also
consider the economic implications. 24 If courts enforce the due-onsale clause they burden the seller's ability to sell; if they do not
enforce the clause they burden the lender's ability to make more
home loans available. The due-on-sale clause, therefore, evolved
from a security device that protects the lender's interest in specific
property to a device that ensures the general economic security of
the institution.
B.

DEVELOPMENT OF STATE COMMON LAW

The motivating factor behind due-on-sale clause litigation is
not consent to the transfer; 25 rather, it is the post-transfer change in
interest rates. The lender refuses to consent to an assumption or
transfer of the mortgage from the original borrower, now seller, to
the purchaser unless the purchaser accepts a higher interest rate.
26
Consent, therefore, is used to exact a higher rate of interest.
The exact form of the due-on-sale clause, which gives the
lender the right to accelerate the payment, varies with the ingenuity
of the drafter. 27 Litigation has focused on a due-on-sale clause
often referred to as paragraph 17 of the Federal National
Mortgage Association (FNMA) and Federal Home Loan Mortgage
28
Corporation (FHLMC) uniform mortgage instrument.
23. Berryhill, supra note 17, at 54 One author recently classified Minnesota as a "hybrid"
jurisdiction in which principles of both "lender oriented" and "borrower oriented" jurisdiction are
found. Comment, Real Estate Financing- The Due-on-Sale Clause: Its Validity in Minnesota, 5 HAMLINE
L. REv. 71, 82 (1982).
24. See Martin v. Peoples Mut. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 319 N.W.2d 220, 226-28 (Iowa 1982)
(discussion of the effect of rapidly rising interest rates on the profits needed to maintain solvency by
Iowa asociations).
25. Sanders v. Hicks, 317 So. 2d 61 (Miss. 1975). Consent to the transfer is only one element in
the clause. For a discussion of consent to transfer, see infra text accompanying notes 59-64.
26. See, e.g., Mills v. Nashua Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 121 N.H. 722, __,
433 A.2d 1312,
1315 (1981) (bank's sole purpose in foreclosing is to obtain a higher rate of interest); Wisconsin Ave.
Assocs., Inc. v. 2720 Wisconsin Ave. Coop. Ass'n, 441 A.2d 956 (D.C. 1982) (clause permitted both
acceleration of the debt and refinancing at the current rate ofinterest).
27. See, e.g., Wisconsin Ave. Assocs., 441 A.2d at 965 (purchaser must refinance at highest
prevailing legal rate of interest); Dunham v. Ware Say. Bank, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1607,
-, 423
N.E.2d 998, 1000 n.4 (1981) (transfer is any act that causes ownership to become vested in another);
First Commercial Title, Inc. v. Holmes, 92 Nev. 363, 550 P.2d 1271 (1976) (mortgage contained sell
or contract to sell language); United Virginia Nat'l Bank v. Best, 223 Va. 112,
-, 286 S.E.2d
221, 222 (mortgage provides that to protect security, borrower covenants not to assign or transfer
property), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 175 (1982).
28. 102 S. Ct. at 3018 n.2. The Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA), referred to as
"Fannie Mae," the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC), and the Government

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 59:57

Paragraph 17 excepts four types of property interest transfers from
its operation. The excepted transfers are as follows: (1) The
creation of a lien or encumbrance subordinate to the mortgage; (2)
the creation of a purchase money security interest for household
appliances; (3) a testamentary transfer upon the death of a joint
tenant; and (4) the grant of a leasehold interest of three years or less
29
that does not contain an option to purchase.
To understand the reasoning of courts in enforcing or
invalidating the due-on-sale clause, a familiarity with the elements
of the clause, the application of the elements to particular factual
situations, and the approaches used by courts in analyzing the
clause is required. The approaches used include examining the
contractual enforceability of the clause, examining the clause as a
restraint on alienation, and examining the effect of equity on the
due-on-sale clause. Each approach is discussed below.
1. ContractualEnforceability of the Clause
Acceleration provisions in mortgages are generally construed
and the intention of the parties ascertained by the same rules
applied to other contracts. 30 Parties usually are held to contract
terms3 1 that they enter freely and openly.3 2 Furthermore, the
33
contractual instrument is strictly construed against the drafter.
This is particularly true in a mortgage situation because the
drafter, usually a financial institution, is dealing with a weaker
34
party.
A basic rule of construction is that a court will look to the
wording of the mortgage for clarity or ambiguity. 35 Also, the
National Mortgage Association (GNMA) are the three federally sponsored secondary mortgage
market agencies. Comment, The New Mortgages:A FunctionalLegalAnalysis,10 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 95,
99 n.19 (1982). FNMA and FHLMC usually require due-on-sale clauses in the mortgages they
purchase. 102 S. Ct. at 3023 n.10. Therefore, the marketability of the mortgage in the secondary
market is directly affected by the legal status of the due-on-sale clause. Savings and loan associations
sell their mortgages in the secondary market to obtain funds for additional home loans. Id. See
generally Randolph, The FNMA/FHLMC Uniform Home Improvement Loan Note: The Secondary Market
Needs the ConsumerMovement,60 N.C.L. REV. 365 (1982).
29. Weiner, supra note 11, at 218 n. 11.
30. Sonny Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Say. Ass'n, 633 S.W.2d 811, 815 (Tex. 1982). See generally
Annot., 69 A.L.R. 3D 713, 739-40 (1976) (language is considered as a whole and accorded popular
usage); 55 AM.JuR. 2DMortgages § 175 (1971) (primary rule is to ascertain intention of parties).
31. Equity, however, will not enforce a contract that is illegal, inequitable, oppressive, or
unconscionable. 27 AM.JuR. 2D Equity 138 (1966).
32. Annot., 69 A.L.R. 3D at 740. See Note, supra note 13, at 611.
33. Williams v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d at 919. The court in Williams held that
any ambiguity in an instrument shall be resolved against the preparer. Id.
34. Mills v. Nashua Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 121 N.H. at __,
433 A.2d at 1314-15.
Realistically, the lender has the money that the borrower needs to purchase the home. Usually, the
borrower is in a take it or leave it position.
35. See Williams v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d at 919.
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language of the mortgage is considered as a whole. 36 The language
is accorded its popular and usual significance with technical words
given the interpretation usually accorded them in the lending
37
business.
When considering the enforceability of a due-on-sale clause,
courts take note of its elements. The clause includes the following
essential elements: (1) a sale or transfer, (2) by the borrower, (3) of
all or any part of the property or any interest therein (4) without the
lender's prior written consent. 38 if these elements are met, the
lender may declare all sums secured by the mortgage due and
payable

9

a. Sale, Transfer, or Conveyance by the Borrower
Usually, the issue relating to the first element is whether the
mortgaged property has been sold, transferred, or conveyed to one
other than the original borrower.4 0 If the property is conveyed, the
clause operates to accelerate the loan. 41 Generally, most courts
consider a conveyance to mean any transfer of legal or equitable
title. 42 Furthermore, a sale is not strictly interpreted to mean only a
36. Annot., 69 A.L.R. 31at 740.
37. Id.
38. For an example of a due-on-sale clause, see supra note 11.
39. A due-on-sale clause allows the lender to accelerate the full amount due, but it is not selfexecuting. McJenkin v. Central Bank olTuscaloosa, N.A., 417 S,. 2d 153, 157 (Ala. 1982). Contra
First Commerical Title, Inc. v. Holmes, 92 Nev. 363, 550 P.2d 1271 (1976). The Holmes court held
that a due-on-sale clause is entitled to automatic entrcement. Id. at 1272.
40. See Williams v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 910, 916-20 (4th Cir. 1981) (creation
of a land trust and subsequent transfer of beneficial interest is a transfer for due-on-sale clause
purposes); Bellingham First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Garrison, 87 Wash. 2d 437, 439, 553 P.2d
1090, 1091 (1976) (real estate contract is an inter vivos transfer within the meaning of the due-on-sale
clause); Mutual Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Wisconsin Wire Works, 58 Wis. 2d 99, 105, 205 N.W.2d
762, 766 (1973) (land contract that gave the purchaser equitable title to the property is a conveyance
within the meaning of the due-on-sale clause).
41. See, e.g., Society for Sav. v. Bragg, 38 Conn. Supp. 8, 444 A.2d 919 (Super. Ct. 1981). Most
lauses do not directly dceline a sale, transfer, or conveyance. By negative implication, however, the
exceptions in the clause limit the definition ofa sale, transfer, or conveyance.
The exceptions to paragraph 17 provide the transfer parameters. If the transaction does not fall
within one of these exceptions it is a sale, transfer, or conveyance. See Williams v. First Fed. Say. &
l.oan Ass'n, 651 F.2d at 920-21; First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wick, 322 N.W.2d 860, 864 (S.D.
1982) (Fosheim, J., concurring). Wick dealt with an ingeniously drafted contract for deed. The
parties included in the contract a statement that it was drawn with paragraph 7, similar to FNMAFHILMC paragraph 17, in mind and that the parties intended compliance with paragraph 7. Id. at
861. The due-cn-sale clause in the contract allegedly created a lien or encumbrance subordinate to
the mortgage. Id. The court, however, did not agree. Id. at 862. But see Daugharthy v. Monritt
Assocs., 293 Md. App. 399, 444 A.2d 1030 (Ct. Spec. App. 1982) (a "wrap around" agreement is
subject to the existing mortgage).
In another recent case a borrower's assignee claimed that the transaction gave rise to a lien or
encumbrance subordinate to the mortgage. Cate Co. v. Midwest Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 324
N.W.2d 202, 2(16 n.3 (Minn. 1982). The court concluded that it "need not decide whether the
translr of a vendor's interest in a contract for deed may create a subordinate lien or encumbrance."
Id. This opinion indicates that it may be possible to create a vendor's interest that is excepted from
coverage by a due-on-sale clause in Minnesota.
42. Williams v. First Fed. Say. & Lcan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1981); Bellingham First
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Garrison, 87 Wash. 2d 437, 553 P.2d 1090 (1976); Mutual Fed. Say. &
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43

Mortgagors have attemped to circumvent the due-on-sale
clause by establishing land trusts, which they contend do not
operate to accelerate the loans. 44 Other parties have tried to relabel
the transaction to fit one of the exceptions in the clause. In a recent
South Dakota Supreme Court case, First Federal Savings & Loan
Association v. Wick, 45 the mortgagor Wick, sold property on a
contract for deed. That contract incorporated the wording from the
original mortgage, but excepted the application of the due-on-sale
clause.4 6 The court held that the contract for deed did not constitute
a lien or encumbrance, but rather, the contract was sufficient to
trigger the due-on-sale clause.4 7 Another court, however, found
that the sale of property "subject to" an existing mortgage did not
48
trigger the due-on-sale clause.
Some courts have reserved opinion on certain title events that
may be considered conveyances for due-on-sale clause purposes. 49
Such events include inheritances; 50 transfers relating to spouses or
Loan Ass'n v. Wisconsin Wire Works, 58 Wis. 2d 99, 205 N.W.2d 762 (1973). See also Century Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Van Glahn, 144 N.J. Super. 48, 364 A.2d 558 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976)
(long term contract for sale caused a "change in ownership").
The term convey or conveyance is not generally considered ambiguous. Annot., 69 A.L.R. 3D
at 741. Convey may be interpreted, in the strict legal sense, to mean a transfer of legal title to land.
Id. at 742.
43. SeeAnnot., 69 A.L.R. 3D at 742.
44. For a discussion of ingeniously drafted clauses, see supra note 41. In Williams v. First Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1981), the homeowner entered into a standard real estate
sales contract. Id. at 912. The contract, subject to the mortgagee's deed of trust, transferred to the
transferee the beneficial interest in a land trust. Id. at 916-20. The court held that a formal
"conveyance" occurred, but no substantive "transfer." Id. at 917. The court found that the "end
result," the transferee's occupying the property, was the same as a purchase of the property in the
customary manner. Id. at 918. The court analogized that "[i]f one travels by by-roads rather than
use an interstate highway, but ends up at the same destination, the journey has nonetheless taken
place." Id. Seealso Case Review, supra note 18, at 526.
45. 322 N.W.2d 860 (S.D. 1982).
46. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wick, 322 N.W.2d 860, 861 (S.D. 1982).
47. Id. The South Dakota Supreme Court previously declared that a due-on-sale clause is
enforceable and that a contract for deed is a sufficient conveyance to trigger the clause. First Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Lovett, 318 N.W.2d 133 (S.D. 1982); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Kelly,
312 N.W.2d 476 (S.D. 1981).
48. Daugharthy v. Monritt Assocs., 293 Md. App. 399, 444 A.2d 1030 (Ct. Spec. App. 1982).
In Daugharthy the deed of trust contained a due-on-sale clause that specifically called for a change in
the interest rate to the prevailing rate if the property was sold to a third party. Id. at __
, 444 A.2d
at 1031. The borrowers sold the property to a third party under a sales agreement that was "subject
to and wrap[ped] around" the existing deed of trust. Id. The court held that in Maryland, under a
sale "subject to" any existing mortgage, the purchaser becomes personally liable only when the
original obligation is assumed by the purchaser. Id. at __,
444 A.2d at 1032. Therefore, under
these unique facts, the court held that no assumption triggering the acceleration clause occurred. Id.
at __,444 A.2d at 1034.
49. E.g., Martin v. Peoples Mut. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 319 N.W.2d 220 (Iowa 1982). The Iowa
Supreme Court expressed concern over certain events that might not be construed as sales or
transfers under the due-on-sale clause. Id. at 231. See also Mills v. Nashua Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
121 N.H. 722, __,
433 A.2d 1312, 1316 (1981) (certain transfers may preclude equitable
enforcement). See generally Bonanno, supra note 12, at 272 n.14 (leases, estate transfers, execution
sale, or bankruptcy may trigger the due-on-sale clause). Recent congressional legislation addressed
some of these transfers by excepting them from triggering the due-on-sale clause. See infra note 169.
50. See, e.g., Egner v. Egner, 183 NJ. Super. 326, 443 A.2d 1104 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1982)
(transfer of title to real property by operation of law and property devaluation by devise or descent do

1983]

NOTE

marriage dissolutions, by agreement or court order; 5 1 transfers to
an inter vivos trust when the mortgagor is a beneficiary; 52 liens or
encumbrances subordinate to the mortgage;5 3 transfers to a trustee
55
in bankruptcy;5 4 and transfers by one co-obligor to another.
Concerning whose actions trigger the clause, one court held that
only a conveyance by the original borrower activates the clause in
56
the mortgage.
b. All or Any Part of the Property or Any Interest
Therein
Basically, this element protects the mortgagee's security
not trigger the "due-on-transfer" clause).
51. See McJenkin v. Central Bank ofTuscaloosa, N.A., 417 So. 2d 153 (Ala. 1982) (mortgagor
conveyed property subject to a due-on-sale clause to former wife).
52. Cf. Williams v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 910, 913 nn.3-4 (4th Cir. 1981)
(borrower created a trust in mortgaged property and sold his beneficial interest).
53. Gate Co. v. Midwest Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 324 N.W.2d 202 (Minn. 1982); First Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wick, 322 N.W.2d 860 (S.D. 1982).
54. See Bonanno, supra note 12, at 272 n.14 (execution sale or bankruptcy sale may trigger the
due-on-sale clause).
55. See Rayford v. Louisiana Say. Ass'n, 380 So. 2d 1232 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (comortgagor's
purchase of his co-owners' two-third interest in mortgaged property and assumption of the loan does
not trigger the due-on-sale clause).
56. Gate Co. v. Midwest Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 324 N.W.2d 202, 206 (Minn. 1982). The
court held that because the mortgage clause contained the phrase "by the borrower," only the
borrower's action would accelerate the mortgage. Id. In this particular case the clause was the
standard FHLMC-FNMA paragraph 17. The Snyders, the original borrowers, sold the property on
a contract for deed to the Timmonses, and Midwest Federal consented to the transfer. The Snyders
also sold their vendor's interest in the contract for deed to Gate Company. Gate Company then sold
the vendor's interest to another institution. Midwest Federal refused to consent to the last sale. The
court held that paragraph 17 was applicable in this case only to an action by the original borrower,
the Snyders. Id. at 206-07.
When the Snyders financed their purchase, they obtained a loan from Midwest Federal
evidenced by a note. As security for the note they pledged the property by a mortgage. Id. at 204-05.
Both the note and the mortgage contained due-on-sale clauses. Id. The mortgage contained
paragraph 17 and the note, in an addendum, contained a similarly worded provision. Id. at 204.
The court held that the mortgage clause did not activate under these facts because Gate
Company was "clearly not a borrower." Id. at 206. The court went on to hold, however, that the
clause in the note was not limited to an action by the borrower. Therefore, the mortgagee could
accelerate the loan. Id. at 207.
The court's analysis of the clause in the note does not consider the intention or purpose of the
whole transaction. The clause probably was devised to prevent the borrower from transferring any
interest in the mortgaged property without the mortgagee's consent. Obviously no other party could
"become vested" without the borrower taking some action. If the Minnesota Supreme Court's
analysis is extended to its logical conclusion, a court ordered property settlement upon a divorce
dissolution, death, business dissolution, or any other action not by the borrower is encompassed by
this decision.
The North Dakota Supreme Court recognized that a promissory note and mortgage are
interrelated documents. Northwestern Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Ternes, 315 N.W.2d 296, 302
(N.D. 1982). The court in Tenes presumed that the conditions of the mortgage relate to the entire
transaction. Id. The court stated as follows:
[TJhe mortgage is given for security and a promise to pay the promissory note and the
conditions set forth therein would prevail as to the security given even though the same
conditions are not recited in the promissory note. Any other approach would bring
about absurd results which the law does not favor.
Id. Applying this analysis the note in Gate would be subordinate to the clause in the mortgage.
Furthermore, the note and mortgage generally are deemed parts of one transaction. 55 AM. JUR. 2D
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interest from depreciating in value. The mortgagee wants to receive
57
any proceeds from the sale or transfer of any part of the property.
Courts usually do not distinguish between the sale-transfer element
and the property-interest element. For example, when considering
whether the transfer of an equitable interest triggers the clause,
courts essentially combine these two elements. 58
c. Lender's Consent
The mortgagor, wishing to dispose of property subject to the
mortgage, usually must obtain prior written consent from the
mortgagee. 59 If consent is not obtained, generally the clause will be
activated. 60
The lender originally required consent to protect his security
interest in the property. Due to changing economic times, however,
the consent element has become a vehicle for obtaining higher
interest rates. 6 1 Several mortgagors have challenged the consent
62
element on the basis that withholding consent is unreasonable.
The courts, however, that have considered the issue have held that
the contractual provision is not "inherently evil, unreasonable, or
Mortgages § 176 (1971). If'a conflict exists in the contract terms, the rules of contract construction
would apply. Annot., 69 A.L.R. 31 at 739. Because the note and mortgage in Gate contained
conflicting terms, they were ambiguous. Therelbre, the note and mnortgage should have been strictly
construed against the drafter.
When the terms of the note and the mortgage are irreconcilable the note generally controls. 55
AM. JOR. 21 Mortgages § 176 (1971). In Gate, however, the note and the mortgage were not
irreconcilable; the intent of the parties was that the mortgaged property not change hands. No
mortgaged property changed hands between tle two lending institutions. Rather Gate sought [terely
to transfer the vendor's lien to another lending institution. Gate, 324 N.W.2d at 206. Therelfire. the
distinction arrived at by the court is illogical.
57. Annot., 69 A.L.R. 3o at 743. For example, the mortgagor may impair the value of the
property by giving an easement, entering a lease, or otherwise disposing of part of the secured
property. Id. at 743 n.48.
58. See, e.g., Williams v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 910, 918 (4th Cir. 1981)
(mortgagor unsuccessfully argued that a conveyance or transftr concerns only full legal or equitable
title); Gate Co. v. Midwest Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 324 N.W.2d 202, 207 (Minn. 1982) (sale of a
vendor's interest into profit-sharing trust transfers fee title).
59. Annot., 69 A.L.R. 31 at 744. See, e.g., Gate Co. v. Midwest Fed. Sav. & l.oan Ass'n, 324
N.W.2d 202, 205 (Minn. 1982) (lender consented to transfcr of equitable interest, but not to profit
sharing trust); Sonny Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Say. Ass'n, 633 S.W.2d 811, 814 n.4 (Tex. 1982) (no
agreement not to convey).
60. Annot., 69 A.L.R.3oat 743.
61. See First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Lockwood, 385 So. 2d 156, 159 (Fla. Dist. Cl. App.
1980).
62. Jurisdictions prohibiting the use of the due-on-sale clause solely to raise interest rates include
the following: Patton v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 118 Ariz. 473, 578 P.2d 152 (1978); Tucker v.
Pulaski Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d 725 (1972); Dawn Inv. Co. v. Superior
Court, 30 Cal. 3d 695, 639 P.2d 974, 180 Cal. Rptr. 332 (1982); Wellenkalp v. Batik of Am., 21
Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978); Wisconsin Ave. Assocs. v. 2720 Wisconsin
Ave. Coop. Ass'n, 441 A.2d 956 (D.C. 1982); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Lockwood, 385 So.
2d 156 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 73 Mich. App.
163, 250 N.W.2d 804 (1977); Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 308 N.W.2d
471 (Minn. 1981) (limited to noncommercial loans); Sanders v. Hicks, 317 So. 2d 61 (Miss. 1975);
State ex reL Bingaman v. Valley Say. & Loan Ass'n, 97 N.M. 8, 636 P.2d 279 (1981). The basic
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67

oppressive." ' 63 These courts have found that "[a] valid business
purpose is served by such a requirement.' '64
2. Restraint on Alienation
Whether a due-on-sale clause is a restraint on the alienation of
65
property is an issue usually raised in due-on-sale litigation.
Courts considering this issue analyze whether the clause is a direct
or indirect restraint on alienation. 66 If restraint exists, courts next
67
consider whether the restraint is reasonable.
a. Indirect or Direct Restraint
When analyzing whether the due-on-sale clause is a direct
restraint on alienation, courts apply the Restatement of Property
section 404 definition. 68 Generally, courts find that the due-on-sale
contention is that it is unreasonable to withhold consent until the lender gets the interest rate or
assumption fee that he desires. See Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 308
N.W.2d at 481 (due-on-sale clause provides the lender with leverage to negotiate a higher rate of
interest). Because it is a contract provision, the clause is subject to those rules of construction
applicable to contracts. 55 AM..JUR. 2DMortgages § 175 (1971). Parties have a right to contract as they
see fit as long as the contract is not illegal or does not offend public policy. See Sonny Arnold, Inc. v.
Sentry Say. Ass'n, 633 S.W.2d 811, 815 (Tex. 1982). In a contractual context, however, the
mortgage is subject to equitable rules and defenses. Id.
63. Sonny Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Say. Ass'n, 633 S.W.2d at 815.
64. Id. The business purpose underlying the enforcement of the contract terms is to assure that
lending institutions remain solvent. Id. at 820 (Spears, J., concurring) (maintaining business
profits).
65. For a list ofcases involving restraints on alienation, see Louisiana Say. Ass'n v. Trahan, 415
So. 2d 592, 595 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
66. See, e.g., Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379
(1978) (direct restraint); Occidental Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, 206 Neb. 469, 293
N.W.2d 843 (1980) (due-on-sale clause is not a restraint on alienation).
67. See, e.g., Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 308 N.W.2d 471 (Minn.
1981) (acceleration clause is a reasonable restraint for commercial property but not for residential
property); Sonny Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Say. Ass'n, 633 S.W.2d 811, 816-21 (Tex. 1982) (Spears,
J., concurring) (indirect restraint but reasonable). See generally L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF
FUTURE INTERESTS § 1164, at 27-30 (2d ed. 1956 & Supp. 1981) (acceleration clauses are generally
enforced but authority exists to the contrary); Volkmer, The Application of the Restraints on Alienation
Doctrine to Real Property Security Interests, 58 IowA L. REV. 747 (1973) (acceleration clause is an
unreasonable direct restraint).
68. E.g., Martin v. Peoples Mut. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 319 N.W.2d at 228. Section 404 of the
Restatement of Property defines a restraint on alienation as follows:
(1) A restraint on alienation ... is an attempt by an otherwise effective conveyance or
contract to cause a later conveyance
(a) to be void; or
(b) to impose contractual liability on the one who makes the later conveyance
when such liability results from an agreement not to convey; or
(c) to terminate or subject to termination all or a part of the property interest
conveyed.
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 404 (1944).

One judge criticized others for blindly adhering to the Restatement, which was written almost
40 years ago. Sonny Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Say. Ass'n, 633 S.W.2d at 817 (Spears, J., concurring).
Justice Spears stated that the restraint question should not be dismissed simply because the clause
does not contain an "express covenant not to convey and thus does not fit squarely and neatly within
section 404(1)(c) of the Restatement." Id.
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clause does not directly cause any of the results contemplated by
the Restatement. 69
Although the clause may not directly effect alienation, some
courts hold that it does so indirectly. 70 Basically their contention is
that due to economic conditions, available real estate loan money
may become difficult if not impossible to obtain. 7 The buyer is
unable to afford the higher interest rate, and the seller is unable to
reduce the purchase price to accommodate the sale. 72 Therefore,
the lender, by not allowing an assumption, effectively precludes or
severely restricts the transaction between the seller and the
73
prospective buyer.

A contrary argument is that instead of being a restraint, the
clause actually removes restrictions on alienability. 74 Because the
mortgage must be paid in full before any transfer, the clause
reduces the encumbrances on the property and actually makes the
75
property more salable.

Other courts realize that the due-on-sale clause may impede
the owner's ability to sell the property without restrictions. 76 These
courts, however, note that every impediment is not a restraint on
alienation. 77 They argue that zoning restrictions, building
restrictions, public improvements, and some covenants may
impede marketability. 78 Yet, these restrictions are not invalid
69. Martin v. People's Mut. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 319 N.W.2d at 228. But see Volkmer, supra
note 67. Professor Volkmer states:
Although written as an acceleration clause the due on sale clause directly and
fundamentally burdens a mortgagor's ability to alienate as surely and directly as the
classical promissory restraint. As such, the due on sale clause is truly a direct restraint
insofar as the category of direct restraints can be articulated.
Id. at 774.
70. E.g., Redd v. Western Say. & Loan Co., 646 P.2d 761, 764 (Utah 1982). See generally L.
SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 67, at 5 (an indirect restraint arises when, while attempting to
accomplish some purpose other than the restraint of alienability, the practical effect does restrain);
Note, supra note 13, at 600.
71. Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 950, 582 P.2d 970, 974, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379,
383 (1978).
72. Id. at 949-50, 582 P.2d at 974-75, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383-84.
73. Id. When interest rates or transactional costs of obtaining a loan rise to the point that few
prospective purchasers can qualify and the lender is unwilling to allow the prospective purchaser to
assume the outstanding mortgage, the transfer of the property is effectively prohibited. The buyer's
down payment may not be adequate to discharge the seller's underlying mortgage. Furthermore, if
assumption is allowed at a higher interest rate, the increase may prevent the sale. Redd v. Western
Say. & Loan Co., 646 P.2d at 763. See also Note, supra note 13, at 601 (given the current tight money
situation, refusal to consent is a practical restraint on salability).
74. Wellenkamp, 21 Cal. 3d at 957, 582 P.2d at 979, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 388 (Clark, J., dissenting).
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Occidental Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, 206 Neb. 469, 293 N.W.2d

843 (1980).
77. E.g., Society for Say. v. Bragg, 38 Conn. Supp. 8, -,
444 A.2d 919, 925 (Super. Ct.
1981).
78. E.g., Occidental Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, 206 Neb. at-,
293 N.W.2d
at 846.
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simply because they impede the owner's ability to maximize his
sale terms.

79

b. Reasonableness of the Restraint
Assuming that direct or indirect restraint exists, the issue is
whether the restraint is reasonable. 0 Generally courts confronting
this issue uphold the restraint if it is reasonably necessary to protect
ajustifiable or legitimate interest of the parties. 81
Parties will not contest the proposition that insecurity is a
legitimate or justifiable interest, which makes the restraint
reasonable. 82 Also, most courts agree that interest rates are the crux
of the issue. At this point, however, the courts diverge in their
operational definition of what constitutes "justifiable or legitimate
interests. '813
In holding to the principle that the restraints must be
"reasonably designed to attain or encourage accepted social or
economic ends, "84 courts that find the restraints reasonable do so
on public policy grounds. 85 In Dunham v. Ware Savings Bank86 the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held the restraints to be
reasonable on three policy grounds. First, the clause strikes an
equitable balance between the lender and the borrower. 8 7 Second,
79. Id. In Occidental Saving the Supreme Court of Nebraska noted a second problem with finding
a restraint. The ((our stated:
1111'the rationale fbr declaring a "due-on-sale" clause invalid as a restraint on
alienation is based upon sone notion that buyers will be less willing to buy at a
ipremium property that does not have a long-term fixed mortgage, then one must
conclude that short-term variable rates and rollover mortgages will similarly impede
the sale of' property and constitute indirect restraints on the free conveyance of
property, and should, therelbre, be held invalid.
/i. at __
, 293 N.W.2d at 848. The court's reasoning reflects the general unwillingness of courts to
even consider the due-on-sale clause as an indirect restraint.
80. See Sonny Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Say. Ass'n, 633 S.W.2d 811, 819 (Tex. 1982) (not all
restraints on alienation are invalid per se; only those restraints that are unreasonable will not be
enforced).
81. Redd v. Western Say. & Loan Co., 646 P.2d at 764.
82. Protection of the lender's security interest is the historical reason for including the clause in
ttortgages. The clause still serves that purpose today. See Comment, supra note 23, at 73.
83. Redd, 646 P.2d at 764. See Sonny Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Say. Ass'n, 633 S.W.2d 811, 820
(Tex. 1982) (Spears,J., concurring) (exacting higher interest rates to maintain profits is a legitimate
business purpose for invoking the due-on-sale clause). But see Wellenkamp.v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal.
3d 943, 952, 582 P.2d 970, 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379, 385 (1978) (increasing interest rates is not a
legitimate purpose of the due-on-sale clause).
84. Baker v. Loves Park Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61 Ill. 2d 119, -, 333 N.E.2d 1,4 (1975).
85. See, e.g., Martin v. Peoples Mut. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 319 N.W.2d 220, 230 (Iowa 1982).
86. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1607, 423 N.E.2d 998 (1981).
87. Dunham v. Ware Say. Bank, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1607, -,
423 N.E.2d 998, 1002
(1981). The situation is equitable when the borrower has the right to prepay without penalty. In that
situation the borrower theoretically could refinance when the interest rates fall. A due-on-sale clause
allows the lender to adjust his rate when interest rates rise. Occidental Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco
Partnership, 2(16 Neb. 469, -,
293 N.W.2d 843, 848 (1980). See also Sonny Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry
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the clause provides state chartered institutions with the same rights
granted to federally chartered institutions.8 8 Third, the clause
socially benefits future borrowers and depositors. 89
The test used by courts that find the due-on-sale clause an
unreasonable restraint is essentially the balancing test set out in
Wellenkamp v. Bank of America.90 In Wellenkamp the California
Supreme Court held that the restraint is reasonable if the quantum
of restraint imposed by the due-on-sale clause does not outweigh
the justifications for enforcing it. 9 1
Courts have held that portfolio maintenance alone is
insufficient justification to outweigh the restraint imposed by the
clause. 92 Sufficient justification in this context seems limited to
94
either impairment of security 93 or risk of default.
Whether the due-on-sale clause imposes a restraint on
alienation, and if so, whether the restraint is unreasonable does not
appear to be open for discussion in those jurisdictions that have
considered the issue. 95 Most courts hold that whether a due-on-sale
clause is a restraint on alienation is a question of law 96 and,
therefore, not subject to an ad hoc consideration. 97 The rationale
supporting this position is that the due-on-sale clause affords more
certainty and greater predictability in land titles. 98 Courts,
however, should not adopt such strict noninterpretative standards.
The body best suited for these policy decisions is the legislature
Say. Ass'n, 633 S.W.2d at 818 (Spears, J., concurring) (restraining effect of due-on-sale clause may
be more pronounced if the contract also contains a prepayment penalty).
88. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at -,
423 N.E.2d at 1002. Two states recently held that state
chartered institutions may not enforce due-on-sale clauses. Gate Co. v. Midwest Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 324 N.W.2d 202, 207 n.4 (Minn. 1982); Att'y Gen. Op. No. 82-703 (Cal. Aug. 17, 1982)
(available Oct. 1, 1982, on LEXIS, States library, Calag file).
89. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at-,
423 N.E.2d at 1002.
90. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
91. Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 949, 582 P.2d 970, 974, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379,
383. (1978). See also Case Review, supra note 18, at 535.
92. E.g., Martin v. Peoples Mut. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 319 N.W.2d at 231.
93. Redd v. Western Say. & Loan Co., 646 P.2d at 765 (acceleration clause protects "security
from waste or depreciation").
94. Id. The risk of default can include "moral risks," which are defined as the risks of resorting
to foreclosure on the security upon default. Id. Essentially, the rationale for not considering portfolio
maintenance as sufficient justification is that the lenders take into account projections of future
economic conditions at the time of the loan. Wellenkamp, 21 Cal. 3d at 952, 582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal.
Rptr. at 385. The lender's failure to correctly project the future should not place an undue burden on
the borrower-owner. Id. at 953, 582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
95. The question of restraint, therefore, should not be a factual issue. "[W]hether a mortgage
imposes a legal restraint on alienation of real estate should not be made to turn on the subjective
intent of the mortgagee." Martin v. Peoples Mut. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 319 N.W.2d at 228-29.
Jurisdictions following this reasoning would not allow any judicial interpretation; all due-on-sale
clauses are per se either valid or invalid. Id.
96. Sonny Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Say. Ass'n, 633 S.W.2d at 820 (SpearsJ., concurring).
97. Martin, 319 N.W.2d at 229.
98. Baker v. Loves Park Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61 Ill. 2d at -, 333 N.E.2d at 5. Predictability
of title contributes to mortgage marketability in the secondary market. Financial institutions do not
want to risk their secondary market investments in unstable mortgages. See Fidelity Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 102 S. Ct. at 3023 n.10.
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where all issues are fully debated. 99
3. Equity and the Due-on-Sale Clause
Although a court may find that a contractually enforceable
due-on-sale clause is not a restraint on alienation, such a finding
does not make the clause per se enforceable. 10 0 Mortgage
foreclosure is an equitable action subject to the equitable defenses
of laches, estoppel, and waiver. 10 1 Moreover, mortgage foreclosure
is also subject to unconscionable or inequitable conduct by the
lender. 102
The conduct that a court will not equitably enforce depends on
the facts of each case. The burden of pleading and proving these
special facts is on the party seeking relief.1 0 3 A majority of courts
hold that increasing interest rates does not constitute
unconscionable conduct.10 4 Courts holding to the contrary contend
that upholding the due-on-sale clause is inequitable because the
clause does not give specific notice of acceleration to the borrower
except in instances of an uncreditworthy assignee. 105 This problem,
however, is easily resolved by drafting more specific mortgage
06
instruments.
C.

STATE STATUTORY LAW

99. See Redd v. Western Say. & Loan Co., 646 P.2d at 767; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-49-

13 (Supp. 1982); S.D. CoMp. LAws ANN. §§44-8-27, -28 (Supp. 1982). See generally, Note, supra note
13, at 618 (statutory correction needed).
100. Annot., 69 A.L.R.3D at 747.
101. See, e.g., First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.Wick, 322 N.W.2d at 862. See also Berryhill, supra
note 17, at 91 (enforcement of equitable defenses depends on the facts of each case).
102. Some courts consider raising interest rates or requiring payment of transfer fees
inequitable. See Rayford v. Louisiana Say. Ass'n, 380 So. 2d 1232, 1239 (La. Ct. App. 1980);
Continental Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fetter, 564 P.2d 1013 (Okla. 1977).
293 N.W.2d at
103. Occidental Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, 206 Neb. at -,
850. Some courts hold that the party seeking equity must show why equity should depart from the
law when considering enforcement of the due-on-sale clause. See Mills v. Nashua Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 121 N.H. 722, 433 A.2d 1312 (1981).
104. For a list of cases in which courts enforced due-on-sale clauses so the lender could update its
loan portfolio, see Martin v. Peoples Mut. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 319 N.W.2d at 230. Thejustification
is that interest rate increases under the acceleration clause are valid because both parties freely
entered into the mortgage. See Mills v. Nashua Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 121 N.H. 722, 433 A.2d
1312 (1981). In Mills the court held:
The plaintiffs also fail to address the question why a court should "depart from
the law which requires it to enforce valid contracts and strike down the acceleration
option simply because its exercise will let [them, rather than the bank], make the profit
on the interest rate occasioned by the increased cost of money."
Id. at -, 433 A.2d at 1315 (quoting Gunther v. White, 489 S.W.2d 529, 532 (Tenn. 1973)).
105. See, e.g., Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 443, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379
(1978).
106. See Berryhill, supra note 17, at 91 (adequate notice provided if the lender includes his intent
to raise interest rates in the clause). See also Wisconsin Ave. Assocs. v. 2720 Wisconsin Ave. Coop.
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Several states have adopted statutes, which to varying degrees
affect mortgages, due-on-sale clauses, and the rights of the parties
under these instruments. Some states statutorily allow the use of a
due-on-sale clause, 10 7 while other states declare it an unreasonable
restraint on alienation unless security is impaired.10 8 Some statutes
give the state lending institutions the same rights granted federally
chartered institutions under federal law. 10 9 Other states set
limitations on prepayment penalties 10 and transfer fees. 1 Finally,
some states provide for alternative forms of financing.11 2
A few statutes are designed to protect consumers from
inequitable practices by lenders. For example, Arizona does not
allow the lender to arbitrarily withhold consent to a transfer.11 3
South Carolina does not allow the lender to raise the interest rate
during the term of the mortgage unless the borrower agrees. Even
with the borrower's consent, the lender may only raise the rate to
one percent above the original loan rate. 1 14 New Hampshire places
mortgage foreclosures within the equitable jurisdiction of superior
courts.1 1 5 Virginia requires that the lender include in any mortgage
or deed of trust containing a due-on-sale clause a notice,"16 either in

capital letters or underlined, advising the borrower of the effect of
Ass'n, 441 A.2d 956 (D.C. 1982) (clause permitted refinancing at current rate of interest).
107. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6:837 (West Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIIED LAWS ANN. 5 21-49-13
(Supp. 1982); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. 55 44-8-27, -28 (Supp. 1982).
108. CAL. CIV. CODE § 711 (West 1982); COLO. REV. ST"AT. §38-30-165 (1982); GA. CODE ANN.
5 67-3002 (Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 535.8(2)(c) (Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. 5 47.20
subd. 6 (Supp. 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-7-12 (Supp. 1981); UTAH CODiE ANN. Ch. 57-15 (Supp.
1981).
109. MONT. CODE ANN. 5 32-2-111 (1981); NEB. REv. STA-r. 5 8-355 (Supp. 1981); NF-v. REV.
STAT. § 673.225 (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS 5 19-23-3.1(b) (Supp. 1982); WASH. REV. CoDE ANN. 55
33.12.012, .014 (Supp. 1982).
110. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 33-806.01 (1974); DEL. ConE ANN. tit. 5, 5 3125 (Supp. 1980);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3301 (1981); IDAHO CODE § 28-22-112 (1980); KAN STAr. ANN. 5 17-5512
(1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 183, 5 56 (West 1977); Miss. CoDE ANN. § 89-1-317 (Supp.
1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. 5 408.036 (Supp. 1982); NEB. REV. SrAr. 5 45-101.02 (1978); N-v. REV.
STAT. § 673.330 (1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. 5 48-7-14 (Supp. 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-L.1A(b)
(Supp. 1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 5 1343-01.1 (Page 1979); OR. REV. STAr. 5 86-150 (Supp.
1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 405 (Purdon 1982); TENN. COD., ANN. § 47-14-1(18 (1979); VA. CoDE
§ 6.1-330.33 (1979); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 138.05 (West 1974 & Supp. 1981). See also 12 C.F.R.
§ 545.8(g)(2) (1982) (tbrbids a prepayment charge for acceleration under a due-on-sale clause).
111. GA. CODE ANN. § 67-1301.1 (Supp. 1982); KAN. STAr. ANN. § 17-5514(1981); KAN. Srir.
ANN. S 58-2335 (1976); NEV. REV. STAT. S 107.055 (1979); N.M. SrAT. ANN. § 48-7-14 (Supp.
1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, 5 42 (Supp. 1982).
112. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-9g (West 1981); IDAHO CODE § 26-1936 (Supp. 1982); INtl.
CODE ANN. § 28-1-21.5-1 (Buens Supp. 1982); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, 5 6020-155 (Purdon 1982). For
a discussion of alternative forms of financing, see DiGiovanni, Alternate Methods of Financingthe Sale and
Purchase of Single Family Residences: Representing the Buyer and the Seller, 50 J. KAN. B.A. 179 (1981);
Walleser, Balancing the Interest: The Changing Complexion of Home MortgageFinancing in America, 31 DRAKE
L. REV. 1 (1981-1982); Comment, supra note 28.
113. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-806.01 (1974).
114. S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-31-90(2) (Supp. 1982) (if the interest rate is raised on loans of less
than one hundred thousand dollars, borrower may prepay without penalty).
115. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 498:1 (1968). See Mills v. Nashua Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 121
N.H. 722, 433 A.2d 1312 (1981) (equity court may bar fbreclosure when acceleration would be
unconscionable or inequitable).
116. VA. CODE 5 6.1-330.34 (1979).
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that clause. 117 Finally, California statutorily excludes certain
transactions from the definition of a due-on-sale clause transfer."8
III. WHETHER SUBSEQUENTLY PROMULGATED FEDERAL REGULATIONS PREEMPT VESTED STATE

RIGHTS
Recently, the United States Supreme Court addressed
whether federal law preempted state law relating to due-on-sale
clauses. In Fidelity FederalSavings & Loan Association v. de la Cuesta"19
the Supreme Court held that federal regulations authorizing dueon-sale clauses in mortgages issued by federal savings and loan
associations preempted conflicting state law. 120 The specific federal
regulation is codified as title 12, section 545.8-3() of the Code of
Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), effective July 31, 1976.121 The

regulation states that a federal savings and loan association

"continues" to have the power to include a due-on-sale clause in its
22
loan instrument. 1
The controversy in de la Cuesta involved purchases of properties
23
encumbered by deeds of trust that contained due-on-sale clauses. 1

The purchasers sought to enjoin federally chartered savings and
loan associations from exercising the clauses. Also, they sought to
have their foreclosure rights declared by the state court. The

purchasers based their action on California state law that prohibits
enforcement of a due-on-sale clause unless the lender's security is

impaired. 124 The association, however, contended that federal law
117. Williams v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1981). The mortgage
form used in Williams complied with Virginia law. The notice stated the following in capital letters
and bold print: "Notice: The Debt secured hereby is subject to call in full or the terms thereof being
modified in the event of sale or conveyance of the property conveyed." Id. at 923 (emphasis omitted).
118. CAL. CIv. CODE §2924.6 (West 1982).
119. 102 S. Ct. 3014 (1982).
120. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de )a Cuesta, 102 S. Ct. 3014, 3025 (1982).
121. 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(0 (1981). For the text of§ 545.8-3(0, see supra note 3.
122. See 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(0 (1981). Section 545.8-3(0 provides in part: "An association
continues to have the power to include [due-on-sale clauses] ....
Id. See First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Anderson, 681 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1982). In Anderson the Eighth Circuit found that the Bank
Board amended the regulation to expressly authorize due-on-sale clauses. Id. at 531. The court
further found that the word "continues" was included in the regulation "in an apparent attempt to
suggest that such clauses have always been enforceable." Id. Also, the court found that the Bank
Board expressly stated in its preamble to the regulation that the regulation was intended to preempt
state law. Id. See also Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 102 S. Ct. at 3019 n.4 (citing a
Bank Board advisory opinion authorizing the use of due-on-sale clauses).
123. 102 S. Ct. at 3020. De la Cuesta involved three cases consolidated at trial. Id.
124. Id. See Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379
(1978). The action in Wellenkamp was based on California Civil Code 5 711, which provides:
"Conditions restraining alienation, when repugnant to the interest created, are void." CAL. CIV.
CODE § 711 (West 1982). See also First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Clark Inv. Co., 322 N.W.2d 258,
260 (S.D. 1982) (citing CAL. CiV. CODE § 711 (West 1982)). The South Dakota Supreme Court in
Clark explained that this statute was adopted by the Dakota Territory Legislature and subsequently
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preempted all conflicting state laws.1 25
The Court found that the dispositive issues were "whether the
Board meant to pre-empt California's due-on-sale law, and, if so,
whether that action is within the scope of the Board's delegated
authority." 126 The Court answered both issues in the affirmative.
The Court concluded that the Bank Board's due-on-sale
regulation was meant to preempt conflicting state limitations
127
imposed on federally chartered savings and loan associations.
Furthermore, the Court concluded that California's state laws
created such a conflict. 128 Finally, the Court concluded that the
language and history of the Home Owners' Loan Act (HOLA) of
1933129 shows Congress' intent to delegate to the Bank Board
sufficient authority to regulate the lending practices of federal
savings and loan associations. 130 Consequently, the Court
determined that the due-on-sale regulation was consistent with both
31
the Bank Board's authority and the purposes of the Act. 1
A.

FEDERAL LAW APPLICABILITY TO MORTGAGES EXECUTED BY
STATE LENDERS AND SOLD TO FEDERALLY CHARTERED INSTITUTIONS

Although the Supreme Court in de la Cuesta decided that
mortgages issued afterJuly 31, 1976, by a federal savings and loan
association were not subject to state law, it did not address whether
federal regulations apply to mortgages that originate in state
institutions and are subsequently sold to federally chartered
institutions.13 2 After de la Cuesta, however, a federal district court
by South Dakota. Id. Section 711 is currently codified in South Dakota as S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 43-3-5 (1967). The South Dakota court refused to follow California's interpretation of this statute
in reference to due-on-sale clauses. 322 N.W.2d at 260.
North Dakota also codified the same statute. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-02-26 (1978). The North
Dakota Supreme Court recognized the similarity of the statutes. Northwestern Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Ternes, 315 N.W.2d 296, 303-04 (N.D. 1982). The court in Ternes, however, concluded
that California's interpretation was distinguishable on the facts because the Ternes plaintiff was a
federally chartered savings and loan association. In this instance the court found that federal law
preempted state law. Id. Furthermore, the Ternes court indicated that the due-on-sale clause did not
violate the North Dakota statute. Id. at 304.
125. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de ]a Cuesta, 102 S. Ct. at 3020. The Supreme Court
discussed the preemption doctrine and explained that federal regulations are given the same effect as
federal statutes. Id. at 3022.
126. Id. at 3023.
127. Id. at 3025.
128. Id.
129. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1470 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
130. 102 S. Ct. at 3025.
131. Id.
132. See Williams v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1981). The court in
Williams raised this issue but failed to resolve it because of "many uncertainties, or assumptions
necessitated by absence of proof to justify that route." Id. at 922. One of the uncertainties was
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addressed this issue. 133
In Bleecker Associates v. Astoria Federal Savings & Loan
Association134 the court examined a due-on-sale clause mortgage
executed in 1973 by a New York state chartered mutual savings
and loan association. 135 On January 31, 1979, the savings and loan
association was deemed in unsound condition by the State
Superintendent of Banks. On that same day the state association
was acquired by Astoria Federal through a merger supervised by
the Superintendent. 136 Astoria Federal agreed to acquire all the
state association's mortgages, including the one executed in
1973.137

Subsequently, the mortgaged property was sold without
Astoria Federal's consent. 138 Astoria claimed that federal law
exclusively governed the mortgage, while Bleecker contended that
139
New York law governed.
Distinguishing de la Cuesta factually, 140 the court applied the
two-part test used by the Supreme Court in de la Cuesta to determine
the preemption issue. The first inquiry was whether the Bank
Board had authority to preempt state law when federal savings
14
institutions acquire mortgages from state lending institutions. ' If
authority existed, the second inquiry was whether the Bank Board
42
intended the regulations to apply in this situation. 1
The Bleecker Associates court held that the Bank Board showed
no intent to preempt state law.143 The court based its decison on a
letter submitted by the Bank Board to the court. 144 The letter stated
that the Bank Board had never confronted this question, nor taken
45
a formal position on it.1
Therefore, the court concluded that
whether [he original lender enjoyed any fideral status that invoked federal preemption. Id.
133. Bleecker Assocs. v. Astoria Fcd.-Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 544 F. Supp. 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
134. 544 F. Supp. 794 (S.I).N.Y. 1982).
135. Id.at 795.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 796. The court lound that if the mortgage had been issued by a federal savings and
loan associatiol, ie,
la Guesta would have been controlling and the interpretations of the mortgage
would have been a itatter oftderal law. Id.
141). The distinction is that the present mortgage was initially held and executed by a state

chartered institution. Id. Furthermore, the court found de laCuesta limited to interpreting a federal
regulation that " 'was meant to preempt conflicting state limitations on the due-on-sale practices of

federal savings and loans .....

Id. at 797 (citing First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de laCuesta, 102

S. Ct. at 3025).
141. 544 F. Sup .at 797.
142. d.
143. Id. at 798.
144. Id. Because the Bank Board had not indicated any position on the matter, the court suggested that the parties ask the Bank Board to submit its position. Id. Mr. John Gunther, the deputy
director of the Litigation Division, responded by letter to the court. Id. at n. 16.
145. In the letter the Bank Board stated that federal law exclusively governs the enforcement of a
due-on-sale clase fbr loans originated by a federally chartered savings and loan. Id.
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under the facts presented, mortgage interpretation was a matter of
state law. 146 The court also noted that to hold otherwise might raise
constitutional issues. 147
B.

FOOTNOTE

14

-

PREEMPTIVE

SCOPE OF

THE FEDERAL

REGULATION

Before concluding that the federal regulation preempted conflicting state law, the Court in de la Cuesta quoted a recently codified
federal regulation. 148 The regulation gives the Bank Board
exclusive authority to regulate the use of due-on-sale clauses in
mortgages executed by federally chartered savings and loan
associations. 149 The Court, however, qualified this statement in a
footnote.1 50 The majority stated that because it found an actual
conflict between federal and state law the Court need not decide
whether the federal regulations "occupy [merely] the field of dueon-sale law or the entire field of federal savings and loan
regulation." 15 1 Arguably, because the regulation does not expressly
forbid the application of equitable principles, 152 a state court could
153
apply those principles to invalidate a due-on-sale clause.
C.

FOOTNOTE

24 -

DESTRUCTION OF A VESTED STATE RIGHT

The Court in de la Cuesta considered whether the federal
regulation could destroy a vested state right. The Court held that
no vested rights were destroyed in de la Cuesta because when the
federal regulation was promulgated it did not conflict with
California law. 154 The Court explained in footnote 241 55 that it need
146. Id. at 799.
147. Id. at 798-99. The court was concerned about finding preemption. If preemption applied,
constitutional issues would exist concerning the impairment of vested property rights acquired under
state law. Id.
148. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de laCuesta, 102 S. Ct. at 3025.
149. 12 C.F.R. § 556.9(0(2) (1982). Section 556.9(0(2) provides that the due-on-sale practices
of federally chartered associations "shall be governed exclusively by the [Bank] Board's regulations,
in preemption of and without regard to any limitations imposed by state law on either their inclusion
or exercise." Id.
150. 102 S. Ct. at 3025 n.14.
151. Id.
152. See First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wick, 322 N.W.2d 860, 863 (S.D. 1982) (Morgan, J.,
concurring). Cf 102 S. Ct. at 3032 n.* (O'Connor, J., concurring). Section 556.9(0(2) implies that
even state equitable principles are preempted. The resolution of this issue is yet to come. It will
probably be subjected to the same analysis as applied to the regulation in de laCuesta.
153. See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946) (equity not limited absent
clear legislative command).
154. 102 S. Ct. at 3031 n.24. Two of the deeds of trust were executed prior toJuly 31, 1976, the
date the regulation was promulgated. Id. The Court noted that the regulation merely codified an
existing advisory opinion by the Bank 5Board.3 Id. (citing 102 S. Ct. at 3019 n.4) (advisory opinion).
Further, the Court explained that § 45.8- (g) codified California state law, which at that time
allowed the enforcement of due-on-sale clauses. 102 S. Ct. at 3031 n.24. Not until Wellenkamp, 21
Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978), in 1978,2 did California law deny the
acceleration of loans under due-on-sale clauses. 102 S.Ct. at 3031 n. 4.
155. 102 S. Ct. at 3031 n.24.
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not decide whether the federal regulation applied to mortgages
executed prior to July 31, 1976, "so as to give the savings and loan
broader authority to enforce a due-on-sale clause than it had when
the [mortgage] was executed." 156

Although left unresolved, this issue probably will not have
much effect on future litigation. Few state courts have confronted
the enforceability issue of due-on-sale clauses executed prior to July
31, 1976.1-7 One Eighth Circuit case would present this issue
58
squarely to the Court. 1

In 1972 the Arkansas Supreme Court declared due-on-sale
59
clauses unenforceable unless the lender's security was impaired.1
In FirstFederalSavings & Loan Association v. Anderson 160 First Federal,
a federally chartered savings and loan association, sought a
declaration by the federal courts that federal law preempted
Arkansas state law regarding the enforceability of due-on-sale
clauses. 161
The mortgage containing the due-on-sale clause in Anderson
1 62
was executed in 1974 and involved property located in Arkansas.
In November 1980 the Andersons sold the property without prior
written consent from First Federal. 1 63 In February 1981 First
Federal filed suit in federal district court. 164 The Arkansas Supreme
Court had declared due-on-sale clauses unenforceable in 1972, the
mortgage was executed in 1974, and the federal regulation was not
promulgated until 1976. Consequently, the parties were certain of
the status of the clause when they entered the contract. Therefore,
in Anderson the borrowers had a vested right not to have the due-onsale clause enforced unless the lender's security interest was
impaired. The Eighth Circuit, however, ruled that no federal
question jurisdiction 1

65

66
existed for the claims. 1

156. Id. The Bank Board contended that 12 O.F.R. § 545. 8-3(l) effected no change in the law.
Id.
157. In jurisdictions that have decided the issue, if the turnover statistics on mortgages are
indicative of the situation, most mortgages executed prior toJuly 31, 1976, will be out of the market
by now. See Dunham v. Ware Say. Bank, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1607,
-, 423 N.E.2d 998, 1001
(1981).
158. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Anderson, 681 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1982).
159. Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, 481 $.W.2d 725 (1972).
160. 681 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1982) (two cases consolidated on appeal; Anderson is the Arkansas

case).
161. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Anderson, 681 F.2d 528, 530 (8th Cir. 1982).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Fora discussion of federal jurisdiction, see section IV of this Note.
166. 681 F.2d at 533-34. Based on this ruling, First Federal has two alternatives. First, because
the merits of the case were not addressed, First Federal may seek to enforce its federally granted right
in state court. The Eighth Circuit stated that it expressed no opinion concerning the application of
Tucker, 252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d 725 (1972), to the facts alleged in Anderson, 681 F.2d at 530 n.3.
First Federal could argue that federal law preempts state law and that the regulation's preemptive
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RECENT CONGRESSIONAL ACTION AFFECTING STATE REFUSAL
TO ENFORCE DUE-ON-SALE CLAUSES

The Bank Board regulations in de la Cuesta apply only to
federally chartered savings and loan associations.1 67 Consequently,
some states assumed that they remained free to control the
enforceability of due-on-sale clauses executed by state chartered
lending institutions and private lenders.1 68 The United States
Congress, however, recently enacted legislation, the Thrift
Institutions Restructuring Act, that extends to state lenders the
same right to enforce due-on-sale clauses enjoyed by the federally
1 69
chartered institutions covered by the Bank Board regulations.
On October 15, 1982, Congress amended the Home Owners'
Loan Act of 1933 for the sole purpose of preempting state law that
prohibits state lenders from exercising due-on-sale clauses.' 70 This
eflect is retroactive to the date of the mortgage. Cf Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de ]a Cuesta,
102 S. Ct. at 3031 n.24. Given T'uckeras precedence and some recent developments, it is possible that
the Arkansas courts may not find de la Cuesta controlling. See Bleecker Assocs. v. Astoria Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 544 F. Supp. 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wick, 322 N.W.2d
860 (S.D. 1982) (Morgan, J., concurring). A court, however, might interpret flootnote 24 to mean
'hat the flderal regulations were not drafted with the intent to preempt vested state property rights.
If the state court result was not favorable to First Federal, it might again foce unfavorable precedence
that it created.
First Federal's second alternative would be to petition the United States Supreme Court lo
review of the Eighth Circuit's decision in Anderson. If the Supreme Court accepts review, it could
find, based on fbootnte 24 of de la Cuesta, that fderal preemption may not be applied to deprive
persons of a vested state right. Such a precedent would jeopardize the present bargaining power of
federal savings and loan associations.
Either route may not prove fruitflul ftr First Federal. First Federal must decide whether it needs
to establish precedence in its favor in this area or whether it should wait for a more favorable factual
setting. If First Federal decides to pursue a legal remedy, state court may be the least risky
alternative. The state court would provide First Federal with some indication of the current status oIf
Arkansas law on due-on-sale clauses. Furthermore, if First Federal loses in state court, it ultimately
has the United States Supreme Court to look to for review.
If First Federal chooses to petition the Supreme Court fbr review of the Eighth Circuit opiniot
in Anderson, it is possible that the Supreme Court would review only the jurisdictional issue. This
would leave the decision on the merits for the trial court. First Federal may be satisfied with the
resolution of only the jurisdictional question because if it prevailed, fieder-al courts would be
established as an available forum. Moreover, suing in federal court may prevent the application of
state equitable doctrines.
167. For a discussion of de la Cuesta, see supra notes 119-56 and accompanying text.
168. California and Minnesota do not extend the right to enflorce due-tn-sale clauses to state
chartered or private lenders unless their security is impaired. Seesupra note 290.
169. Thrift Institutions Restructuring Act, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 1982 U.S. CoOF CoaN. & At,.
NEws (96 Stat.) 1496 Ihereinalter referred to as Thrift Institutions Act . ,
The Thrift Institutions Act provides in pertinent part: "Notwithstanding aty provision oIf the
constitution or laws ... of any State to the contrary, a lender may.. enter into or enlorce a contract
containing a due-on-sale clause .... " Id. § 341(b)(1), at 1505.
This section is subject to the limitation that if binding state law prohibiting tle exercise of dueon-sale clauses exists prior to enactment of' this Act, such state law will control fibr three years
following enactment. Id. at 1505-06. During this interim "window" period the states that already
have laws contrary to this Act, may by state law enacted by the legislature, otherwise regulate such
contracts. Id. § 341(c)(1)(A), at 1506. The states that have no constitutional provision or law to the
contrary at the date of enactment are bound by the Act.
A lender is defined to include any "person or government agency making a real property loan."
Further, the Act exempts federally chartered savings and loan associations. Id. § 341(a)(2), at 1505.
170. Presumably the reason Congress passed this legislation rather than the Bank Board just
promulgating a regulation to the same eflect is because the Bank Board's authority probably does not
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legislation gives state lenders the same rights provided the federally
chartered lenders under de la Cuesta. Presumably, Congress felt that
without this Act state lenders would be at a financial
disadvantage. 1 71 The economic soundness of a lending institution is
fundamental to its solvency. By employing the due-on-sale
rates, state lenders will be able
mechanism to update their interest
72
to compete with federal lenders. 1
The Act preempts all state law in the due-on-sale area with one
exception. If conflicting state law 173 existed at the time of the Act's
enactment, the legislature in that state must decide within three
years from the date of enactment whether to exempt the state
mortgage law from coverage under the Act. The Act becomes
binding on the state if it fails to legislate within the "window"
1 74
States with no conflicting law at the date of enactment
- period.
are bound by the Act.
The primary issue raised by this legislation is whether
Congress has the power under the United States Constitution to
enact such a regulation. The United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of the commerce clause in Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Association175 and National League of Cities v.
Usery 7 6 would probably be central to the controversy. 177 Complete
coverage of this issue, however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
extend this far under HOLA. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in de la Cuesta, found that there was "no
indication in HOLA ... that Congress has empowered the [Bank] Board to determine whether and
when federal law shall govern the enforceability" of due-on-sale clauses. 102 S. Ct. at 3033
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Justice O'Connor stated in her concurring opinion that
"it is clear that HOLA does not permit the [Bank] Board to preempt the application of all state and
local laws." 102 S. Ct. at 3032 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Based on these opinions a court could
find that the Bank Board is without power to promulgate a regulation similar to this Act. Therefore,
the banking lobby had Congress circumvent this argument by enacting the legislation.
171. The federally chartered lenders could use the due-on-sale clause to guarantee their solvency
while the state lenders would be unable to update their interest rates. This concern was expressed in
the House debate of the Act. See H.R. 6267, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. H8424, H8426,
H8438 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982).
172. Lenders want the ability to sell, or discount, the mortgage on a secondary market to
generate more money to lend. If the purchaser is given the option of purchasing a mortgage with a
due-on-sale clause or one without the clause, economically the one with the clause is a better buy.
Therefore, the clause makes the mortgage more salable on the secondary market. When a state
lender competes against a federal lender, the state lender's mortgage becomes less marketable
because it contains no enforceable due-on-sale clause.
173. State law includes the following: constitutional provisions, statutes, and decisions of the
highest court of the state or decisions of the next highest appellate court that has rendered a decision
applicable statewide. Thrift Institutions Act § 341(c)(1), supra note 169, at 1505. Whether the
constitutional provision or statute must specifically state that due-on-sale clauses are not enforceable
was never addressed during debate. California, North Dakota, and South Dakota could argue that
their statutes against restraints on alienation are statutes barring the enforceability of due-on-sale
clauses. See supra note 124 for the similarities between these statutes.
174. Thrift Institutions Act § 341(d), supra note 169, at 1506.
175. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
176. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
177. Congress has the exclusive power to regulate commerce under the commerce clause. E.g.,
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The issue would then become whether the
Act regulates interstate commerce.
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Assuming that Congress has the power to enact this
legislation, a second issue is whether Congress can legislate
exclusive remedies under the Act. The Act provides that the dueon-sale "clause shall be exclusively governed by the terms of the
loan contract, and all rights and remedies . . . shall be fixed and
governed by the contract." 178 Congress has the authority to limit
statutorily the remedies available under a right it creates. 1 79 The
United States Supreme Court qualified this rule in Porter v. Warner
Holding Co. 180 In Porterthe Court held that "equitable jurisdiction is
not to be denied or limited in the absence of a clear and valid
legislative command." 181
Recently, in Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo18 2 the Court had an
opportunity to address whether the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act (FWPCA) precludes courts from exercising equitable
discretion in its enforcement. The Court held that "Congress may
intervene and guide or control the exercise of the courts' discretion,
but we do not lightly assume that Congress has intended to depart
from established [equitable] principles."' 183 The Court found that
neither the language and structure of FWPCA nor the legislative
history suggested that Congress intended to deny courts their
84
traditional equitable discretion. 1
From the language of the due-on-sale Act it is not clear
whether Congress intended to preclude equitable remedies.
Arguably, the Act does not present the clear legislative command
required by Porter. If Congress intended to preclude equitable
85
remedies, it could have done so with express, concise language. 1
The Act provides exceptions to the general rule that due-on178. Thrift Institutions Act § 341(b), supra note 169, at 1505. This language implies that the
contract exclusively governs all remedies. Therefore, a strict reading of the Act would preclude
equitable remedies unless they are included in the contract.
179. Congress limits the remedies available in various areas. See, e.g., TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153 (1978) (Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1976), limits the remedy to an injunction);
Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974) (Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a)
(1976), generally prohibits injunctive relief against the IRS); 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1976) (labor disputes
under the Norris-LaGuardia Act). States also limit remedies available under their Workmen's
Compensation statutes. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-08 (1960) (no right of action for damages
for personal injuries exists; sole compensation is from the Workmen's Compensation fund). See
generally K. YORK &J. BAUMAN, REMEDIES, CASES & MATERIALS 90-91 (3d ed. 1979) (Anti-Injunction
Act and Norris-LaGuardia Act are congressional limits on federal courts' equitablejurisdiction).
180. 328 U.S. 395 (1946).
181. Id. at 398.
182. 102 S.Ct. 1798 (1982).
183. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 102 S. Ct. 1798, 1803 (1982).
184. Id. at 1806.
185. Cf Thrift Institutions Act § 341(d), supra note 169, at 1506. When the due-on-sale clause is
exercised, the Act merely encourages the lender to permit the assumption of the "loan at the existing
contract rate or at a rate which is at or below the average between the contract and market rates." Id.
§ 341(b)(3). In any case the lender can require the transferee of the borrower to meet customary
credit standards. Id. § 341(c)(2)(A).

1983]

NOTE

sale clauses can be exercised in all cases.' 86 These exceptions limit
the types of transfers that trigger the due-on-sale clause. The
exceptions include the traditional equitable situations in which
87
courts hold that the due-on-sale clause should not be exercised.1
Finally, a transfer occurring prior to enactment of the Act and
falling within the exception that state law did not allow
enforcement unless security was impaired is not subject to the

Act. 188
This recent legislation will provide the basis for future
litigation. Whether the Act can withstand the threshold
constitutional issue and whether it precludes equitable remedies
will determine furture congressional action in banking legislation.
Nevertheless, state legislatures that have the option have three
years to address these issues or they will be resolved by the courts.
IV. FEDERAL JURISDICTION
The issue of federal jurisdiction arises when one party claims
that federal law preempts state law. A federal savings and loan
association usually claims that the federal regulations give it the
right to enforce the due-on-sale clause notwithstanding state law to
the contrary. 89 The issue is either initially raised in federal court
through a declaratory judgment action'9 " or removed to federal
court from a state court. 1 91
The United States Supreme Court in de la Cuesta was not
presented with the federal jurisdictional issue because the case was
appealed from the California Court of Appeal after the Supreme
Court of California refused certiorari. 192 The de la Cuesta holding
93
was limited strictly to federal preemption of state law.1
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the
jurisdictional issue involving federally chartered savings and loan
186. The exceptions include the same lour covered under paragraph 17 of the Bank Board
standard mortgage form.. See supra note 3. In addition the exceptions include the following:
inheritance, transtier to a spouse or child of the borrower, divorce dissolution transfer, transfer into
an inter vivos trust in which the borrower is the beneficiary and remains in occupancy, and any other
transfer covered by the Bank Board regulations. Thrift Institutions Act § 341(c)(2)(B), supra note
169, at 1506. For a general discussion of these types of transfiers, see supra notes 49-55 and
accompanying text.
187. See, e.g., Martin v. People's Mut. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 319 N.W.2d 220 (Iowa 1982) (court
reserved opiition on the exempt types oftransfiets).
188. Thrift Institutions Act 9 341(c)(2)(B), supra note 169, at 1506.
189. Fora discussion of preetnption, see supra notes 119-31 and accompanying text.
190. For a discussion of declaratory judgment actions, see infra notes 264-75 and accompanying
text.
191. Fora discussion of removal actions, see infra notes 253-63 and accompanying text.
192. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Detroit Bond & Mortgage Inv. Co., 687 F.2d 143, 145 •
(6fti Cir. 1982).
193. 102 S. Ct. at 3021-22.
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conflicting

A. "ARISING UNDER" JURISDICTION

Before rendering a decision on the merits of a case, a federal
court must resolve the jurisdictional issue. If a court lacks
jurisdiction to hear a case it also lacks authority to adjudicate the
merits. 195
Courts considering the jurisdictional issue have looked to the
statutory authority. Federal jurisdiction is usually claimed under
federal question jurisdiction 96 and federal subject matter
jurisdiction. 197 The key wording in both statutes is that the matter
must "arise under" the laws of the United States or Acts of
Congress. 198
1. FederalQuestionJurisdiction
a. Historical Background
The United States Supreme Court, in considering whether a
suit arose under the laws' 99 or Constitution of the United States,
stated in Gully v. FirstNationalBank2°° that:
194. For decisions finding no jurisdiction, see First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Detroit Bond &

Mortgage Inv. Co., 687 F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1982); Michigan Say. & Loan League v. Francis, 683
F.2d 957 (6th Cir. 1982); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Anderson, 681 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1982);
Trent Realty Assocs. v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 657 F.2d 29 (3d Cir. 1981); Guinasso v.
Pacific First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 656 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1716
(1982); Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 635 F.2d 797 (10th cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 1018 (1981); Coral Gables Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Harbert, 527 F. Supp. 284 (S.D. Fla.
1981).
For decisions finding jurisdiction, see Williams v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 910
(4th Cir. 1981); Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fox, 481 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd,
663 F.2d 1078 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 3508 (1982); Bailey v. First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 467 F. Supp. 1139 (C.D. 111.1979). Cf Conference of Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Stein, 604
F.2d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1979) (court applies similar federal regulations, but analyzes the issue as a
problem ofjusticiability), aff'dmem., 445 U.S. 921 (1980).
195. Trent Realty Assocs. v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 657 F.2d 29, 36 (3d Cir. 1981). The
court in Trent recognized the frustration that inevitably arises when a court would have held for the
complaining party, yet is without discretion to do so because "[a] federal court is bound to consider
its own jurisdiction preliminary to consideration of the merits." Id. See also First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Detroit Bond & Mortgage Inv. Co., 687 F.2d 143, 145 (6th Cir. 1982) (jurisdiction must be
affirmatively resolved before the merits).
196. 28 U.S.C.A. 5 1331 (West Supp. 1982). Section 1331 provides that "[t]he district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States." Id.
197. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1337(a) (West Supp. 1982). Section 1337(a) provides that "[tihe district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of
Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and commerce against restraints and
monopolies." Id.
198. Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 635 F.2d 797, 800 (10th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1981).
199. The definition of laws is construed in this context to include regulations. Coral Gables Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Harbert, 527 F. Supp. 284, 287 n.2 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
200. 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
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[T]he controversy must be disclosed upon the face of the
complaint, unaided by the answer or by the petition for
removal ....
Indeed, the complaint itself will not avail as
a basis of jurisdiction in so far as it goes beyond a
statement of the plaintiffs cause of action and anticipates
20
or replies to a probable defense. 1
The Court held that although a right is granted by federal statute, a
suit to enforce that right is not necessarily, or for that reason alone,
20 2
one arising under federal law.
The rationale in Gully is that Congress or the Constitution
should provide federal jurisdiction. If Congress or the Constitution
did not limit federal jurisdiction, a litigant could find "countless
20 3
claims of right" based on a federal statute or the Constitution.
b. Federal Question Application to Due-on-Sale
Clause Regulations Promulgated by the Bank
Board
Courts that have considered the jurisdictional issue primarily
rely upon Gully. 204 In Coral Gables Federal Savings & Loan Association
v. Harbert20 5 the court considered a foreclosure action brought by
Coral Gables, a federally chartered savings and loan association.
Coral Gables sought to have the disputed due-on-sale clause
06
declared enforceable. 2
The issue before the court was "whether a federal savings and
loan's suit for foreclosure of a home mortgage triggered by the
mortgagor's default under the due-on-sale clause constituted a
claim arising under federal law." ' 20 7 The court stated that
jurisdiction must be determined by a well pleaded complaint, that
an answer raising a federal defense cannot be used to invoke
jurisdiction, and that it is "insufficient for the plaintiff to assert that
federal law invalidates some anticipated defense of the
defendant. "208
201. Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 113 (1936) (citations omitted). Gully involved the
power of a state to lay a tax upon a national bank. The state contended that the power to tax a
national bank was granted within a federal statute. Id. at 111-12.

202. Id. at 114. The Court stated that "[niot every question of federal law emerging in a suit is
proof that a federal law is the basis of the suit." Id. at 115.
203. Id. at 118.

204. See, e.g., Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 635 F.2d 797 (10th Cir. 1980)
(federal regulations involving escrow accounts versus state contract law), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1018
(1981); Coral Gables Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Harbert, 527 F. Supp. 284 (S.D. Fla. 1981)
(mortgage foreclosure triggered by due-on-sale clause).
205. 527 F. Supp. 284 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
206. Coral Gables Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Harbert, 527 F. Supp. 284, 285 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 286.
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The court held that the decisive factor was the federal nature
of the action rather than whether any established federal right was
alleged. 20

9

The court found that mortgage foreclosure was the

nature of the action. Further, the court found that the due-on-sale
21 0
clause was an alleged federal right.

In Coral Gables the court applied the Gully approach. The court
stated that although the Bank Board's regulation authorizes dueon-sale clauses, the regulation does not create the claim. The court
concluded that the underlying action relied on property law, which
traditionally is governed by state law. 21 1 The court stated the

general rule that federal preemption is a defense to a state law
claim, and therefore, preemption alone does not establish federal
jurisdiction.2 1 2 Other courts have relied on the same principle to
21 3
deny jurisdiction.
In Madsen v. PrudentialFederal Savings & Loan Association21 4 the
Tenth Circuit concluded that the suit was based on state law and
that the federal regulation only created a defense to recovery.2 1 5
The court held that such a defense is immaterial to the federal
question jurisdiction issue. 21 6 The court stated that property law is
typically a matter of state concern. Further, the court found that in
21 7
this case state law created the contractual obligations.
Consequently, applying Gully, the Madsen court held that no federal
right, unaided by the petition for removal, was disclosed on the face
2 18
of the complaint.
209. Id. at 287.
210. Id. at 290. To some this may be hair splitting. One court concluded that the existence of
federal jurisdiction in a preemption situation is a "close question." First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Detroit Bond & Mortgage Inv. Co., 687 F.2d 143, 145 (6th Cir. 1982). A careful reading of Gully,
however, shows that the Court was setting the bounds for federal court jurisdiction. The Court
distinguished those disputes that arose under the laws of the United States from those in which
federal law was merely collateral. 299 U.S. at 118. The Court refused to establish a rigid test for
federal question jurisdiction and realized that a case by case analysis is the common sense approach.
299 U.S. at 117.
Professor Wright observed that no "clear test has yet been developed to determine which cases
'arise under' the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." C. WRtIGrr, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 18, at 63-64 (3d ed. 1976). Proflssor Mishkin suggests that ftr
original federal question jurisdiction to exist, the action must include "a substantial claim foundd
'directly' upon federal law." Mishkin, 7.he Federal "Question" in the DistrictCourts, 53 Coi.uM. L. R-:.v.

157, 168 (1953).
211. 527 F. Supp. at 288 n.3.
212. Id. at 288.
213. See Michigan Say. & Loan League v. Francis, 683 F.2d 957 (6th Cir. 1982); First Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n v. Anderson, 681 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1982); Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 635 F.2d 797 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1981). But see Williams v. First Fed.
Sav.& Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1981). The court in Williams held that a "etleral question
arises as to whether, as a matter of contract between the lender and the borrower ....
a sale or
transfer" occurred as defined by the regulation. Id. at 912 n.2.
214. 635 F.2d 797 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1981).
215. Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 635 F.2d 797, 804 (10th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1981).
216. Id. at 801.
217. Id. at 802.
218. Id. at 803.

1983]

NOTE

Similarly, other courts have rejected federal savings and loan
associations' attempts to sue in federal court. 219 In Trent Realty
Associates v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association220 the Third
Circuit held that a federal preemption issue alone does not create
federal question jurisdiction if the issue merely anticipates a federal
defense. 22 1 Trent involved a due-on-sale clause that specifically
included a prepayment interest penalty provision authorized by
222
federal regulations.
c. Mortgage Cases That Have Addressed Federal
Jurisdiction
The principal case relied on by parties seeking federal court
jurisdiction is Conference of Federal Savings & Loan Associations v.
Stein. 223 In Stein the appellant, California's Secretary of Business
and Transportation, contended that federal courts were without
jurisdiction to hear the due-on-sale clause action. The Secretary
alleged that the savings and loan associations were using federal
224
preemption as a defense to a potential state claim.
The Ninth Circuit distinguished Public Service Commission v.
Wycoff Co. 225 The court's basis for this distinction was that in Wycoff
the plaintiff offered no proof of any threatened act by the state
commission that might affect the rights of the party contending
federal preemption. 226 The court reasoned that Stein differed
because the state threatened to impose sanctions against the savings
2 27
and loan association.
Based on this distinction the Stein court concluded that an
"actual justiciable controversy" was presented because the
conflicting positions of the parties created an actual conflict. 228 The
219. For a list of cases denying federal jurisdiction involving a federal defense, see supra note
213.
220. 657 F.2d 29 (3d Cir. 1981). This decision was based upon Gully, Louisville & Nashville
R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908), and Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667

(1950).
221. Trent Realty Assocs. v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 657 F.2d 29, 35 (3d Cir. 1981).
222. Id. at 30-31.
223. 604 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'dmem., 445 U.S. 921 (1980).
224. Conference of Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'ns v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'd
mem., 445 U.S. 921 (1980). Stein involved a state regulation subjecting federally chartered
associations to state antiredlining practices. Id. at 1257.
225. 344 U.S. 237 (1952). In Wycoff the Court held that "it is the character of the threatened
action, and not of the defense" that determines federal question jurisdiction. Public Serv. Comm'n
v. WycoffCo., 344 U.S. 237, 248 (1952). The Court stated: "Federal courts will not seize litigations
from state courts merely because one, normally a defendant, goes to federal court to begin his
federal-law defense before the state court begins the case under state law." Id.
226. 604 F.2d at 1259.
227. Id.
228. Id. But cf. Smart v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 500 F. Supp. 1147, 1159 (E.D. Mich.

1980) (criticizing Stein's justiciability analysis). For a discussion of justiciability, see L.

TRIBE,
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conclusion was subsequently applied by

229
other courts to distinguish Stein.

The Ninth Circuit, in two subsequent decisions, 230 held that
Stein presented a different issue. Guinasso v. Pacific First Federal
Savings & Loan Association23 1 involved interest payments on funds
held in escrow accounts by savings and loan associations. The
Guinasso court distinguished Stein on the basis that the claim in Stein
involved more than a possible defense to potential state claims. In
232
Guinasso, however, the claim merely raised a possible defense.
Therefore, the court found no federal jurisdiction. 233
The second case involved a due-on-sale clause. In Nalore v. San
Diego Federal Savings & Loan Association234 the Ninth Circuit
considered whether federal preemption of due-on-sale clauses
granted federal court jurisdiction. The court found that Guinasso
presented virtually the identical jurisdictional issues, 235 and
therefore, Guinasso was controlling. The court stated that the
complaint presented a basis for relief that was governed entirely
under state mortgage foreclosure 236 law. Consequently, the court
concluded that the federal district court lacked jurisdiction.
Presumably, the Ninth Circuit will not find federal jurisdiction. 237
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-8, at

53 (1978).

229. See Michigan Say. & Loan League v. Francis, 683 F.2d 957 (6th Cir. 1982). In Francis the
court held: "[J]usticiability presupposes subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, the propriety of
federal preemption as a basis for subject matter jurisdiction was not before the United States
Supreme Court when it affirmed Stein. Thus, Stein is procedurally inapplicable to the instant case."
Id. at 962. See also First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Anderson, 681 F.2d 528, 534 n.9 (8th Cir. 1982)
(Stein court analyzes the jurisdiction issue as a problem of justiciability); Guinasso v. Pacific First
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 656 F.2d 1364, 1367 n.10 (9th Cir. 1981) (Stein presented a justiciable
controversy arising under federal law), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1716 (1982).
230. It is arguable that a third case reflects upon the Ninth Circuit's present unwillingness to
follow Stein. The Ninth Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, reversed and remanded a federal district
court ruling that jurisdiction existed in a due-on-sale clause federal preemption case. Glendale Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fox, 663 F.2d 1078 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'g 481 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1979),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 3508 (1982).
231. 656 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir. 1981) cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1716 (1982).
232. Guinasso v. Pacific First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 656 F.2d 1364, 1367 n.10 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1716 (1982).
233. 656 F.2d at 1367.
234. 663 F.2d 841 (9th Cir. 1981).
235. Nalore v. San Diego Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 663 F.2d 841, 842 (9th Cir. 1981). The issue
in Guinassowas whether federal preemption is a basis for federal jurisdiction in a removal action. 656
F.2d 1364. The ground for removal in Nalore was that federal law preempts conflicting California
state law in the area of due-on-sale clauses. 663 F.2d at 842.
236. 663 F.2d at 842. The proper basis for relief in this case is to bring the mortgage foreclosure
in state court. Id.
237. In Guinasso the court distinguished Stein. 656 F.2d at 1367 n.10. Because Nalore held
Guinasso to be controlling, Stein may be impliedly overruled. 663 F.2d at 842.
Courts relying on Stein for jurisdiction base their reliance on the fact that Stein was affirmed
summarily by the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Town of Springfield v. McCarren, 549 F.
Supp. 1134, 1144 (D. Vt. 1982). See also Michigan Say. & Loan League v. Francis, 683 F.2d 957 (6th
Cir. 1982) (Edwards, C.J., dissenting). The Supreme Court, however, has stated that in summarily
affirming a case, the Court does not necessarily adopt the lower court's reasoning. "Our affirmance
indicates only our agreement with the result reached by the [lower court]." Sporhase v. Nebraska ex
rel. Douglas, 102 S. Ct. 3456, 3461 (1981).
In Stein the Ninth Circuit addressed two issues, jurisdiction and preemption. The Ninth Circuit
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87

Another opinion often cited by federal savings and loan
associations seeking federal jurisdiction is Williams v. First Federal
Savings & Loan Association.238 In Williams the Fourth Circuit
considered due-on-sale clauses in four cases consolidated on appeal.
One case was in federal court based on diversity, but diversity was
not alleged in the other three cases. 239 In a footnote, the court stated
that a federal question arose under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.240 The court
held that a federal question arises when the issue is whether a
change in beneficial ownership constitutes a sale or transfer within
the meaning of the regulation. 24 1 The court, however, did indicate
uncertainty about its jurisdiction in two of the cases. 24 2 Because the
Fourth Circuit expressed doubt and failed to articulate its "belief"
in federal jurisdiction, other courts have distinguished and
24 3
criticized Williams.
2. FederalSubject MatterJurisdiction
Title 28 U.S.C.A. § 1337(a) provides in part: "The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or
aflirmed the district court's judgment finding preemption. The Supreme Court, by summarily
affirming Stein, was not affirming the lower court's rationale but ony indicating its agreement in the
result.
TIhe United States Supreme Court had an opportunity to resolve the correctness of courts'
reliance on Stein last term, but failed to do so. See Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fox, 663 F.2d
1078 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 3508 (1982). The Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court's opinion, which included the jurisdictional issue. After de la Cuesta the Supreme Court denied
review. 102 S. Ct. at 3508.
238. 651 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1981).
239. Williams v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 910, 912 n.2 (4th Cir. 1981).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. The court was uncertain whether federal law applied to a state chartered association's
loan or to a deed of trust executed prior to the effective date of the regulation. Id. Nevertheless, the
court concluded that even if no federal question arose and the case should have been dismissed, its
decision on the merits would not, because of the doctrine of stare decisis, cause a significantly
difkrent result than would an affirmance of the lower court's dismissal. Id.
243. SeeTrent Realty Assocs. v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 657 F.2d 29, 35 (3d Cir. 1981);
Coral (;ables Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Harbert, 527 F. Supp. 284, 289 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
In First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Peterson, 516 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. Fla. 1981), the district
court held that federal question jurisdiction existed to consider the preemption issue of due-on-sale
clauses. The court found that cases withholdingjurisdiction were distinguishable. Id. at 733 n.1. The
reasons for distinguishing those cases were as follows: (1)the status of the parties is determinative of
jurisdiction; (2) the federal question jurisdictional basis, preemption, appears on the face of the
complaint; (3) declaratory relief is sought; (4) a defense is not anticipated; and (5) an actual
controversy exists over a federal question. Id.
This analysis lacks adequate support. First, although First Federal brought the action, this is
not dispositive ofjurisdiction. Federal courts will not seize litigation from state courts merely because
one party, normally a delendant, seeks to begin a federal law defense in federal court before the state
court begins the case under state law. Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 248
(1952).
The Supreme Court held in Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908),
that "lilt is not enough that the plaintiff alleges Ithat] some anticipated defense .. .is invalidated
[under federal law]." Id. at 152. If a question of federal law surfaces in the course of litigation, this
alone does not cause the action to arise under the Constitution. Id. Professor Charles Wright explains
that if an issue concerning title to land arises because of federal law, federal jurisdiction exists to
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proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce
or protecting trade and commerce against restraints and
monopolies." 244 Section 1337(a) essentially parallels section 1331.
Both sections are primarily concerned with cases "arising under"
laws or Acts of Congress. 245 Section 1337 differs from section 1331
in one respect; section 1337 is concerned with regulation of
commerce. 246
Parties seeking federal jurisdiction under section 1337 claim
that the regulations promulgated by the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board regulate commerce. 24 7 The courts that have addressed this
Home Owners' Loan
issue conclude, with little discussion, that the
248
Act of 1933 is an Act regulating commerce.
Assuming that HOLA regulates commerce, this factor alone
does not fulfill the jurisdictional requirements of section 1337. The
threshold question under section 1337 is whether the mortgage
foreclosure action "arises under" an Act of Congress. 249 In
deciding whether an action arises under an Act of Congress, courts
apply the same analysis under section 1337 as they do under section
remove the cloud on the title, but not to quiet title. C. WRIGHT, supra note 210, at 69-70. Professor
Wright believes that the well-pleaded complaint rule unnecessarily and impractically restricts the
business of federal courts. Id. In Peterson, then, jurisdiction would exist to declare that federal law
preempts state law on due-on-sale clauses, but not to declare a mortgage foreclosure.
Second,'the mere allegation of a federal question is not controlling on jurisdiction. Sometimes it
is necessary for courts to realign the parties in a declaratory judgment action when analyzing the
jurisdictional question. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Anderson, 681 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1982).
This realignment is used to determine whether the declaratory plaintiff affirmatively asserts a federal
claim or only asserts a defense to a possible state court action. Id. at 533. In Peterson the mortgagee
asserted the defense that federal law preempts conflicting state law. 516 F. Supp. at 733.
Third, declaratory relief does not provide a separate basis for jurisdiction. Michigan Say. &
Loan League v. Francis, 683 F.2d 957, 960 n.7 (6th Cir. 1982) ("[section] 2201 does not ipso facto
provide a basis for federal jurisdiction"). If the complaint in the declaratory judgment asserts a
defense to a potential state court action, the nature of the threatened action, not the defense, will
determine jurisdiction. Wycoff, 344 U.S. at 248. To hold otherwise would "distort the limited
procedural purpose of the [Act]." C. WRIGHT, supra note 210, at 71.
Finally, the court in Peterson overemphasizes the argument that an actual controversy existed
over a federal question. Although an actual controversy may exist, a justiciable issue alone does not
provide jurisdiction. See Michigan Say. & Loan League v. Francis, 683 F.2d at 962 (justiciability
presupposes subject matterjurisdiction).
244. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1337(a) (West Supp. 1982).
245. Michigan Say. & Loan League v. Francis, 683 F.2d 957, 960 n.6 (6th Cir. 1982) ("arising
under" accorded same meaning in 5 1337 and § 1331); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Anderson,
681 F.2d 528, 532 (8th Cir. 1982) (key language in both statutes is "arising under").
246. Section 1337 could be considered more specific than § 1331. Section 1331 is generally
related to all civil actions while § 1337 is directed to those civil actions that affect commerce. 28
U.S.C.A. §§ 1331, 1337 (West Supp. 1982).
247. E.g., Goldman v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 377 F. Supp. 883, 884 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
248. Id. Little rationale is given in Goldman. The court merely states that the better reasoned
cases grant jurisdiction under § 1337 and cites a Second Circuit opinion, which held that the
commerce clause need not be the exclusive source of federal power to find §1337 jurisdiction. Id. at
885 (citing Murphy v. Colonial Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 388 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1967)). See also
Gibson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 347 F. Supp. 560, 564 (E.D. Mich. 1972) ("it appears clear
that [HOLA] is an act regulating commerce").
249. The courts in Goldman and Gibson found § 1337 jurisdiction, but failed to analyze whether
mortgage foreclosure is an action arising under an Act of Congress. Goldman, 377 F. Supp. at 884-85;
Gibson, 347 F. Supp. at 564-65.
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1331.250 This analysis requires that the federal law relied on for
jurisdiction must form a direct and essential element of the cause of
action. This cause of action may not be based on a defense or an
anticipated defense. 251 Ordinarily, federal preemption is
considered a defense. 252 Furthermore, mortgage foreclosure actions
are governed by state law. Therefore, it can be argued that federal
courts lack subject matter jurisdiction in due-on-sale cases because
the mortgage foreclosure action does not "arise under" an Act of
Congress.

B.

ALTERNATIVE

STATUTES

GRANTING

FEDERAL

COURT

JURISDICTION

1. RemovalJurisdiction
Title 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441 provides for removal of cases from
state court to federal court. 25 3 The language in section 1441(b) is
similar to that found in section 1331 and section 1337. Courts
analyzing the removal issue have applied the same "arising under"
analysis as applied under section 1331 and section 1337. Moreover,
many courts do not distinguish section 1331, section 1337, and
2 54
section 1441 in their decisions.
One court indicated concern over this problem. In Coral Gables
FederalSavings & Loan Association v. Harbert255 the court recognized in
a footnote that section 1441(b) and section 1331 are similar. 25 6 The
250. Michigan Say. & Loan League v. Francis, 683 F.2d at 960 n.6; First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Anderson, 681 F.2d at 532.
251. See, e.g., First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Anderson, 681 F.2d at 534.
252. See Michigan Say. & Loan League v. Francis, 683 F.2d at 960 (federal law arises only as a
preemption defense). Cf Guinasso v. Pacific First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 656 F.2d at 1367 n.9
(federal regulations only present federal defenses in preemption cases). But see Glendale Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Fox, 481 F. Supp. 616, 626 (C.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd, 663 F.2d 1078 (9th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 3508 (1982). In Glendale the action was brought "not to guard against the
possibility of state action, but to remedy state action already taken." 481 F. Supp. at 626.
253. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441 (West 1973). Section 1441 provides in part:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original
jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court
of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action
is pending.
Id. § 1441 (a). Subsection (b), which sets forth the types of cases that may be removed, provides:
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a
claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall
be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties.
Id. § 1441(b).
254. E.g., Nalore v. San Diego Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 663 F.2d 841 (9th Cir. 1981); Madsen
v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 635 F.2d 797 (10th Cir. 1980).
255. 527 F. Supp. 284 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
256. Coral Gables Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Harbert, 527 F. Supp. 284, 289 n.6 (S.D. Fla.
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court noted that if jurisdiction was found under section 1331, any
mortgagor in future state court due-on-sale foreclosure actions
could remove the action to federal court. 257 The court was
concerned that allowing state due-on-sale clause litigation in
federal court would open the door to other litigation involving
regulations encompassing similar problems. 258 The court stated,
"If the compass is reset for due on sale cases, new highways of
litigation may come traveling into the federal court.' '259
To avoid overloading already full dockets, federal courts have
been reluctant to broaden the scope of jurisdictional statutes. Their
rationale is that remanding actions to state courts does not
prejudice the parties' rights because any improper consideration of
their rights in state court is subject to United States Supreme Court
260
review.
Courts that find removal jurisdiction resolve the issue by
applying section 1331.261 These courts hold that the real nature of
the claim must be considered when ascertaining removal
jurisdiction. 262 Generally, they find that federal preemption
263
provides "arising under" jurisdiction.
2. Initiate the Action in Federal District Court Under the
DeclaratoryJudgmentAct
A party seeking federal court jurisdiction may initiate the
action in federal district court under the Federal Declaratory
Judgment Act. 264 Title 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201 gives federal courts the
discretionary power of declaratory relief. 265 The Act establishes two
1981).
257. Id.
258. Id. The court in Coral Gables was concerned that ifjurisdiction was established for due-onsale clauses, other litigation may arise dealing with the loan instruments, notes, and bonds covered
by the same regulations. Id.
259. Id. The same concerns are discussed by the United States Supreme Court in Gully. For a
discussion of Gully, see supra notes 200-03 and accompanying text.
260. E.g., First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Siegel, 529 F. Supp. 562 (M.D. Fla. 1982).
261. E.g., Bailey v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 467 F. Supp. 1139 (C.D. Il. 1979).
262. E.g., Rettig v. Arlington Heights Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 405 F. Supp. 819, 823 (N.D.
I1. 1975).
263. E.g., Meyers v. Beverly Hills Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 499 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1974).
264. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201 (West 1982). Usually the plaintiff is a federal savings and loan seeking
a declaration that due-on-sale clauses are enforceable because federal law preempts state law. E.g.,
First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Anderson, 681 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1982). Occasionally, a mortgagor
will bring an action seeking a declaratory judgment that a transfer did not trigger a due-on-sale
clause. E.g., Williams v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1981).
265. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201 (West 1982). Section 2201 provides:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, . . . any court of the United
States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other
legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further
relief is or could be sought, Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a
final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.
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requirements that must be met before a court may issue a
declaratory judgment. First, an "actual controversy" must exist
and second, that controversy must be within the federal court's
266
jurisdiction.
Assuming the first requirement is met in due-on-sale
litigation, a court must still resolve the jurisdictional issue. Because
the Act is only procedural, no federal jurisdiction is conferred by
section 2201 alone. 267 Rather, jurisdiction must be founded on
either diversity, subject matter, or federal question jurisdiction.
The United States Supreme Court in Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips
Petroleum Co. 268 held that the Act was not intended to expand the
jurisdiction of federal courts. Rather, the Act merely provided an
enlarged range of permissible remedies.2 69 Two recent Sixth
Circuit opinions applied this principle.
2 7 ° a group of
In Michigan Savings & Loan League v. Francis
federally chartered savings and loan associations sought a
declaratory judgment that they were exempt from provisions of
Michigan's Mortgage Lending Practices Act. 27 ' The court held
that the plaintiff's failure to establish subject matter jurisdiction
2 72
precluded a declaratory judgment.
Similarly in First Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Detroit
Bond & Mortgage Investment Co. the Sixth Circuit held that Francis
was controlling 273 despite a strong dissent by Judge Weick. 274 In
Detroit Bond First Federal sought a declaration that federal
preemption applied to due-on-sale clause litigation. The court held
that federal subject matter jurisdiction did not exist.27 5 These
decisions indicate that federal courts, after de la Cuesta, will not find
federal jurisdiction in due-on-sale clause litigation.
C.

RESOLUTION OF THE FEDERAL JURISDICTION ISSUE

Litigants seeking to enforce rights granted by federal law can
look to state courts for protection of those rights. If state courts
266. Id.
267. See Michigan Say. & Loan League v. Francis, 683 F.2d at 960 n.7.
268. 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
269. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950). Section 2201 is
headnoted as a remedy. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201 (West 1982).
270. 683 F.2d 957 (6th Cir. 1982).
271. Michigan Say. & Loan League v. Francis, 683 F.2d 957, 958 (6th Cir. 1982).
272. Id. at 960.
273. 687 F.2d 143, 145 (6th Cir. 1982).
274. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Detroit Bond & Mortgage Inv. Co., 687 F.2d 143, 145-46
(6th Cir. 1982) (Weick, J., dissenting).
275. Id. at 145.
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prejudice the parties' legal rights, they can "appeal adverse state
decisions to the Supreme Court of the United States.' '276 This may
seem like a harsh approach, but as a matter of judicial economy,
federal courts were never meant to be the forum for all actions
277
involving federal rights.

In Glendale FederalSavings & Loan Association v. Fox278 Glendale
Federal brought an action in federal district court seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief. Glendale Federal alleged that
federal law preempted California state law in the area of due-onsale clauses.2 79 The federal district court held that federal
regulations exclusively govern the validity of due-on-sale clauses in
loan instruments executed by federally chartered savings and loan
institutions.

280

On the jurisdictional issue the district court found that
Glendale Federal could not avoid the Wycoff principle that no
federal jurisdiction exists when a federal claim is a mere defense to
a state court action. 28 ' The court noted that the Ninth Circuit
"clarified" Wycoff in Rath Packing Co. v. Becker. 282 In Rath the court
found that the principal concern in Wycoff was the nature of the
controversy.2 83 Therefore, the district court in Fox found that Rath
distinguished Wycoff because the controversy in Rath arose
independently of any state court action. 284 Furthermore, Wycoff
involved only a mere possibility of adverse state action, while Rath
presented an actual adverse state action. 285 Therefore, the district
tourt reasoned that federal jurisdiction existed in Rath but not in
Wycoff
The district court concluded that Glendale Federal's action
was more in line with Rath because the action was brought to
remedy past rather than possible future state action. 286 On this
276. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Siegel, 529 F. Supp. 562, 563 (M.D. Fla. 1982).
277. Gully, 299 U.S. at 114.
278. 481 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd, 663 F.2d 1078 (9th Cir. 1981), cerl. denied, 102 S.
Ct. 3508 (1982).
279. Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fox, 481 F. Supp. 616, 618-21 (C.D. Cal. 1979),
rev'd, 663 F.2d 1078 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 3508 (1982).
280. 481 F. Supp. at 632-33.
281. Id. at 625.
282. Rath Packing Co. v. Becker, 530 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1975), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1976), cerl. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977) (separate petition for certiorari
filed by California's Director of Food and Agriculture).
283. 530 F.2d at 1304-05.
284. Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fox, 481 F. Supp. at 626.
285. Id. In Rath the State of California ordered Rath Packing Company to stop selling bacon in
California in violation of unfair competition laws. Rath Packing Company filed a declaratory
judgment action in federal court seeking a judgment that federal law preempted California state law
in this area. 530 F.2d at 1304-05.
286. 481 F. Supp. at 626. Glendale Federal wanted to serve as the lender in a housing project
sponsored by the California Department of Real Estate. Glendale Federal was notified that its
mortgage forms did not comply with California law because they contained due-on-sale clauses. Id.

1983N

NOTE

basis the district court found subject matter jurisdiction.2 8 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed and remanded without opinion the district court's
decision. 288 Glendale Federal thereafter petitioned for certiorari to
the United States Supreme Court. After deciding de la Cuesta the
Supreme Court denied certiorari. 289 Presumably the Court was
indicating that only the preemption issue was decided in de la
Cuesta.290
V.

STATE EQUITABLE
CLAUSE ACTIONS

REMEDIES IN DUE-ON-SALE

It may be too early to predict the effect of de la Cuesta on state
law. Some jurisdictions, however, have indicated what they might
hold if confronted with the enforcement issue. 29' The general view
is that due-on-sale clauses may be authorized by federal
regulations, but mortgage foreclosure is an action that must be
292
brought in state court.
Another issue in state courts is whether the court may invoke
its equitable powers to deny the enforcement of a due-on-sale clause
in a mortgage issued by a federally chartered savings and loan. One
federal district court prior to de la Cuesta discussed this issue in a
declaratory judgment action seeking to foreclose a mortgage. 293 In
First FederalSavings & Loan Association v. Siega1294 the court held that
"obviously" state courts have the power to deny enforcement.2 95
The court pointed out that if the parties seeking to enforce
mortgage foreclosures think otherwise, "they may appeal adverse
state decisions to the Supreme Court. ' 296 Clearly, the court in
Siegal believed that state courts have exclusive jurisdiction to
at 620.
287. Id. at 626. The jurisdictional section of the opinion is not entirely clear. First, the court
does not discuss the statutory language of 28 U.S.C. § 1337 or 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Also, the district
court failed to discuss the threshold "arising under" issue.
288. Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fox, 663 F.2d 1078 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S.
Ct. 3508 (1982).
289. Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fox, 102 S. Ct. 3508 (1982).
290. Because the de la Cuesta Court made no reference to the jurisdictional issue, the question
remains open for consideration.

291. Gate Co. v. Midwest Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 324 N.W.2d 202, 207 n.4 (Minn. 1982) (de
la Cuesta applies only to lending institutions regulated by the Bank Board; Minnesota law still

governs state lenders); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wick, 322 N.W.2d 860, 863 (S.D. 1982)
(Morgan, J., concurring) (equity is not precluded by de laCuesta); Att'y Gen.Op. No. 82-703 (Cal.
Aug. 17, 1982) (available Oct. 1, 1982, on LEXIS, States library, Calag file) (Wellenkamp governs
state lenders notwithstanding de laCuesta).

292. See First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Siegel, 529 F. Supp. 562, 563 (M.D. Fla. 1982).
293. Id.
294. Id. The court dismissed the suit for lack of federal jurisdiction. Id. at 563.
295. Id.
296. Id.
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entertain mortgage foreclosures and that state courts may use all
297
the powers associated with that equitable action.
A concurring opinion subsequent to de la Cuesta supports this
basic proposition. In First Federal Savings & Loan Association v.
Wick298 the South Dakota Supreme Court confronted a due-on-sale
clause in a mortgage executed by a federally chartered savings and
loan. 299 Justice Morgan in his concurring opinion stated that
notwithstanding de la Cuesta, "the enforcement of a due-on-sale
clause remains subject to equitable defenses including
unconscionability. "300 He concluded that de la Cuesta does not
change the established state court precedents that recognize
30 1
equitable defenses as bars to enforcement of due-on-sale clauses.
Considering this limited authority combined with the right
factual situation, 30 2 the recent Thrift Institutions Restructuring
Act, 30 3 and the recent federal regulation declaring due-on-sale
clauses absolutely enforceable, 30 4 the effect of state equitable
defenses on due-on-sale clause enforcement actions may become
an important issue in the preemption area. It is quite possible,
given one of the situations outlined by the court in Mills v. Nashua
Federal Savings & Loan Association,30 5 such as an interspousal
transfer, that a state court may find that enforcement serves no
social purpose. The best solution is for state legislatures, the Bank
Board, or both to establish guidelines where problem areas exist.
Any legislation drafted by these groups, however, must protect all
vested rights presently existing under state law.
VI. CONCLUSION
De la Cuesta may have resolved the due-on-sale preemption
issue, but it left many issues unresolved. If the Bank Board
continues to promulgate regulations legitimizing due-on-sale
297. Another court has taken a similar position. See First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Lockwood,
385 So. 2d 156, 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (party who initiates a suit in equity must be subject to
all the applicable consequences of that action). Similarly, another court identified the equitable issue,
but was spared deciding it. See Williams v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d at 922 n.28 ("we
are fortunately spared the complications associated with what to do where a due-on-sale clause is
valid under federal law, but in a particular case leads to a result which state law would disallow as
inequitable").
298. 322 N.W.2d 860 (S.D. 1982).
299. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wick, 322 N.W.2d 860, 861 (S.D. 1982).
300. Id. at 863 (Morgan, J., concurring).
301. Id.
302. For a discussion of a factual situation ripe for litigation, see supra notes 154-66 and
accompanying text.

303. Thrift Institutions Act §341(d), supra note 169, at 1506. For a discussion of this Act, see
supra notes 167-88 and accompanying text.
304. 12 C.F.R. § 556.9(0(2) (1982). For the text of §556.9(0(2), see supra note 149.
305. 121 N.H. 722, 433 A.2d 1312 (1981).
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clauses and if present interest rates remain substantially higher
than interest rates in mortgages executed eight to ten years ago,
future due-on-sale clause litigation is inevitable.
Courts will continue to confront jurisdictional issues, which
must be resolved before the courts may discuss the merits. A court's
opinion on the underlying merits of any action is irrelevant unless
the court has subject matter jurisdiction. Apparently, a majority of
federal courts will not entertain jurisdiction over due-on-sale clause
mortgage actions. Their rationale may not be flawless, but without
direct guidance from the United States Supreme Court it is
persuasive.
The resolution of issues concerning state lenders will depend
upon the actions taken by individual states. The states have three
years to legislate their future. If they fail to act, the courts will be
forced to resolve the due-on-sale clause issues. Consequently, to
preserve certainty in mortgage contracts, state legislatures have the
obligation to decide the future of the due-on-sale clause. Finally,
the resolution of the equitable enforcement issue likely will provide
the United States Supreme Court with the most difficult due-onsale clause question in the future.
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